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SAUDIS PAY FIRST INSTALLMENT TO 'ARAB DEVELOPMENT DECADE FUND'

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 89, 24-30 Oct 81 p 44

[Article by Al-Sirr Sayyid Ahmad: "Saudi Arabia Inaugurates Arab Development Decade With 1.75 Billion Dollars"]

[Text] The "Arab development decade," approved by the Arab summit held in Amman last year, began its practical steps in Kuwait at the end of last month. In that summit, the five Arab countries of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, and UAE and Qatar agreed to pay \$1 billion during 10 years, i.e., at the rate of \$500 million annually [sic], to finance the development decade.

The five countries' ministers of finance had met at the beginning of this year and asked Kuwait and the Arab Economic and Social Development Fund to prepare a paper to transform the summit resolutions into a reality.

The latest meeting was held to determine the shares and contribution of each of the five countries toward the total sum and it was agreed that Saudi Arabia would pay 35 percent or \$1.75 billion, Kuwait 25 percent or \$1.25 billion, Iraq and the UAE 15 percent each or \$750 million, and Qatar 10 percent or \$500 million, thus bringing the total sum to \$5 billion.

The absence of Libya and Algeria, despite their being two oil producing countries, is due to the fact that they did not participate in the Amman summit and, consequently, have not abided by its resolutions. The five countries have left the door open to any Arab country wishing to participate in the financing process, especially since the agency managing the operation is the Development Fund in whose activities all the Arab countries are participants.

The five ministers also agreed to determine the countries which will benefit from the fund's financial allocations, deciding that they will be the poorer Arab countries. By referring to the UN definition of poor countries, it was clear that there are six Arab countries, out of a total of 31 countries in the world, to which the definition applies, namely: South Yemen, North Yemen, Somalia, Djibouti, Sudan and Mauritania.

The five ministers of finance formed among themselves a board to manage the development fund, assisted by Dr Muhammad al-'Imadi, the director of the Development Fund, as general rapporteur. The ministers have also decided that the

fund will focus more strongly on infra-structure projects than on projects with an immediate investment yield. The fund will also set unified conditions for dealing with these countries.

The basic concept [of the fund] is to narrow the gap between the less developed Arab countries and the other countries of the Arab world. Narrowing this gap will help the Arab world to move forth with a balanced development, especially since a unified strategy has been adopted and since this strategy aspires to secure sufficient nutritive substances, to conclude unified investment agreements, to guarantee the free movement of individuals and of capital and to adopt harmonious policies in the sphere of manpower and energy.

League's Role

The Arab League had spent \$24 million on the meetings and the fundamental studies approved by the Arab kings and presidents at the Amman summit. The ministers of finance underlined the need to benefit from the existing organizations and from the available human and technical capabilities instead of creating new organizations. The choice fell on the Development Fund in which all the Arab countries participate and which focuses its efforts on the sphere of development.

The Arab Economic and Social Development Fund, which has a capital of nearly 400 million Kuwaiti dinars, began its activities 9 years ago. The fund advances loans on easy terms and at interest rates ranging from 4-6 percent for periods extending to 20 years. The projects the fund usually finances focus on the poor countries or are projects of an integrative nature, i.e., projects from which more than one country benefits. The fund has recently financed studies for a telecommunication project to link Somalia with North Yemen, Sudan, and the Kijibouti and another project to link Jordan with Syria and Iraq. One of the fund's most successful projects is its financing of the "Open Sesame" educational children's program which is prevalent in a number of Arab countries. At present, the fund is preparing for the second Arab energy conference which will be held in Abu Dhabi early next year.

In the wake of the oil price hikes in the early 1970s, numerous oil producing countries proceeded to set up development funds to help the poor countries improve their balance of payments and finance their development projects. Estimates say that the volume of the aid advanced by the Arab oil producing countries to the other Arab countries rose from nearly \$1 billion in 1973 to more than \$5 billion last year. But, despite this jump, the effect has not been tangible, especially in the development sphere, due to the lack of coordination on the one hand and to channelling the funds to such areas as political and military aid on the other hand. The adoption of a unified economic strategy and the allocation of the funds necessary for this strategy constitute the required and desirable step which has been actually lacking. The recent Kuwait meeting is the beginning of the route to realization of this strategy.

8494

CSO: 4404/138

EURO-ARAB TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FACES PROBLEMS

London 8 DAYS in English No 10, 13 Mar 82 p 53

[Text]

FOR YEARS the Euro-Arab dialogue has dragged on, with few political results. But transfer of technology is an area which both sides still believe could be productive. Several projects, blocked since 1978, have now been revived. They include the Euro-Arab technology transfer centre, a Polytechnic and a joint study of completed projects.

The preliminary studies for the technology transfer centre will be undertaken by two experts from each side. The Arab side, however, has proposed that the centre follow the framework and guidelines of a study on a hypothetical transfer centre prepared by the UN Commission for Western Asia. The Europeans are not convinced. They are likely to favour the inclusion of clauses like those of existing EEC agreements with individual Arab states — for example Jordan, Egypt and Algeria — which when examined closely amount to little more than a definition of some sales functions that are normally carried out by a commercial attaché or a trade mission.

For example, they talk of 'promoting contacts between firms so as to facilitate the transfer of technology,' 'arranging favourable terms for the purchase of patents, licences and the like,' or stimulating private investment and establishing joint ventures. Modest as they are, these clauses are further watered down by being restricted to projects that serve 'mutual interests' and to products for domestic or, at best, regional consumption.

The Arab world is well aware that the EEC wants to use such cooperation agreements to influence Arab industrial plans, so that European industries are protected. Instead, Arab industrialists feel that the EEC should discuss possibilities of complementarity between the two regions openly, instead of attempting to turn the proposed technology transfer centre into a promotion for its own industrial wares and

know-how.

Europeans also roused Arab suspicions when they sought to keep the directorship of the centre in their hands. The attempt misfired and the Arab side insisted that the centre should not only be Arab directed but should have the nature of an Arab organisation. The wrangle ended when the post of director and nine out of the 15 seats on the board were allocated to Arabs.

The Arabs intend that the technology transfer centre, as a pan-Arab institution, will serve as a technological link between the national and sectoral research and development institutions being set up in most Arab states. An umbrella body would prevent duplication and facilitate information exchange. Hopefully the centre will assist both the private and public sectors, and cooperate with other international organisations.

An important function of the technology centre would be the establishment of a data bank covering products and processes. In addition it would supply preliminary information about methods, machinery, suppliers and contractors of the kind that is needed before feasibility studies can go ahead. The information bank can tell an Arab contractor, for example, whether the developed country supplier is overstressing its capacity to handle the project, or has a history of failures or foul-play elsewhere, so enabling Arab contractors and governments to negotiate contracts and technology purchase deals on favourable terms.

Apart from the functions of the Euro-Arab Technology Centre, another matter of contention between the EEC and the Arab League concerns the financial arrangements. There have already been haggles about the apportionment of the annual budget of \$2m-\$3m. Now both sides admit that costs for this and other joint projects have been underestimated by 100-200 per cent.

IMPLICATIONS OF WEINBERGER VISIT, IRAQ'S ADMISSION TO GCC EXAMINED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1320, 19 Feb 82 p 29

[Article by 'Adil Malik: "The Gulf Cooperation Council Opens To Iraq"]

[Text] No sooner had Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz bid farewell to the French Minister of Defense and signed agreements with him to strengthen the Saudi naval and other forces, when he welcomed the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger. The link between the two visits is the Saudi Arabian Kingdom's desire to strengthen its land, sea and air forces with the most modern weapons, and to obtain these weapons from different sources. Prince Sultan calls it an armament "for the sake of peace," i.e. to ensure a supply of weapons for self-defense so long as the Kingdom is a confrontation state.

The most outstanding achievement of the U.S. Secretary of Defense's visit to Riyadh is the conclusion of procedures for the sale of AWACS planes. After the political decision and the battle embarked on by the Reagan administration through the constitutional establishments to ratify this deal in America, including the Saudis' purchase of the most modern and advanced planes in the field of air surveillance and radar, came the time to delve into the military and technical details. During these discussions Prince Sultan ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz became aware of the necessity of completing everything connected with the sales agreement on time, according to the established schedule, "to eliminate any negligence on the part of the United States in some of the purchased items, and to prevent the occurrence of any delay in delivering the planes or any other item that has been agreed upon." It appears that the U.S. Defense Secretary presented Prince Sultan with sufficient and clear guarantees in the name of his country and pledged America's complete adherence in this area. He said, "Washington is ready to make good on any negligence in matters relating to delays connected with the armament projects." And in order that these promises and pledges would not remain oral or within the limits of a specific temporary efficacy, the agreement between the two parties was concluded by the formation of a joint committee that is essentially a follow-up committee, with the leadership shared by Prince Sultan and Weinberger. They agreed to meet twice a year in a place to be agreed upon at a later time. It was likewise agreed that a number of assistants and experts from both sides would meet on a regular basis to study the details of the existing projects between America and Saudi Arabia in general, and not only in the military field.

Concerning whether the discussions ended up in the Kingdom obtaining new advanced weapons, Prince Sultan explained that his country "takes only advanced weapons, whether from America or anyone else." He added, "The Kingdom does not request any weapons unless it has the ability to understand these weapons." These discussions were a natural occasion to examine the general situation in the region in light of Israeli aggravation of the situation by announcing the annexation of the Golan Heights, and its daily operations in southern Lebanon. Prince Sultan hoped it would be a propitious occasion to remind the American secretary of his country's responsibilities in the region. He expressed with courtesy and firmness his hope that the present American administration would adopt a firm position against the tyrannical Israeli actions and follies, in view of America's responsibility as a great nation interested in the preservation of peace, and in view of its close relations with Israel.

On Saudi-American relations in general, there is a point of view heard in Riyadh emanating from the peace initiative proposed by Prince Fahd and what happened at the Fez summit. This opinion says, "If the Arab rejectionist states agree to the initiative, they will put the Kingdom in a better negotiating position with America to put pressure on Israel to yield to the peace process in the region. Indeed, if this Arab consensus were to be achieved, it would impose great responsibilities on the Kingdom from the viewpoint of etiquette and ideology to place the greatest possible pressure on the American administration to achieve the just and necessary peace."

When the goals behind the opposition of some to the initiative are expounded, in addition to everything that has been publicly stated up til now, the answer comes that "some Arab parties want Saudi-America relations to collapse and for these relations to be disturbed to serve the specific goals of the struggle of the great nations in the region."

Within the scope of cooperation between America and the Gulf region, Weinberger played the diplomat when he said, "The United States undertakes to assist the Gulf states economically and militarily, and intends to continue to offer this assistance, if these states wish to receive it." The first reaction was from one of the member states in the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], the Sultanate of Oman, which Weinberger visited after Riyadh, and which denied rumors that Oman intends to diminish the public aspects of military cooperation with the United States. It added, "Muscat is aware of the necessity of having a strategic balance in the region to guarantee the prevention of errors in case of necessity."

With the emergency meeting of the defense ministers of the GCC states in Bahrein and the other movements in the Gulf, whether secret or public, the "Gulf war" (the international name for the war between Iraq and Iran) still goes on. The GCC has been eager ever since its establishment last year not to adopt a firm position with regard to the Iraq-Iran conflict, and this has often provoked Iraq's resentment. It was recently observed that there has been an "opening up" in the Cooperation Council toward Iraq, and a move from a phase of passive neutrality to a phase of adherence. In the Bahrein meeting, the defense ministers of the GCC states announced for the

first time their support of Iraq's request to bring up the subject of the conflict in the upcoming Arab summit conference in Fez. Indeed, the Gulf ministers went further than that when they "observed" in their closing statement "Iraq's continued readiness to bring about a just solution to this war....Iran is the one that refuses all solutions."

If some "obstacles" prevented Iraq's inclusion in the GCC at the time of its establishment, it is clear that there have been several changes in the orientations of this Council "to protect the Gulf household," and one might say that Iraq has now come to be "within the Gulf group" in fact, even if it is not a member of it.

On this subject, we call attention to the visit to Riyadh of the first deputy prime minister of Iraq, Taha Yasin Ramadan, when he delivered to Prince Fahd a letter from Iraqi President Saddam Husayn for the Saudi ruler, King Khalid. In spite of Iraq's desire that the war with Iran end today, tomorrow or before the meeting of the conference of non-aligned states next September, it is acting as if the war will go on for a long time; in any case, it has no other choice.

As a result of what was revealed by the events of Bahrein, published and still unpublished, Riyadh will see intense Gulf activity in the next few days: the ministers of the interior in the GCC are set to meet for the first time in the Saudi capital on 23 February, and a basic working document has been prepared for presentation to those who are assembled, dealing with how "to protect the Gulf front from within," and this will be directly followed by a meeting of the Arab ministers of the interior also in Riyadh, where the focus will be a discussion of the issues of "security and crime in the Arab nation."

At the same time Saudi Arabia has been working on another Arab front: Prince 'Abd Allah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, second deputy prime minister and president of the National Guard, visited Damascus. It has been rumored that this visit has a relationship to the good efforts to remove enmity, insofar as is possible, between Baghdad and Damascus. Prince 'Abd Allah returned to Riyadh as news came of the Hamah incidents.

9397

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GCC FOCUSES ON SECURITY, IRANIAN PROVOCATIONS

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1320, 19 Feb 82 pp 33, 35

[Article by Nash'at al-Taghallubi: "The Priority of Defending the Gulf Moves Political Center From North to South"]

[Text] When the agreement to announce the creation of a Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] was concluded, there were three main orientations, as is evident in the form taken by this Council, which led it to disregard or set aside questions of security in the opinion that "economic, cultural and social unity" were the most important considerations at the time.

Last month it was confirmed to the Gulf states that the problem of security must take absolute priority over any other problem. Based on this reality, the ministers of defense in the Gulf countries met in Riyadh to study the means of "confronting Iranian attempts to impose the influence of Tehran on neighboring Arab capitals in a way which almost exceeds, or indeed does exceed, the method of the deceased Shah who used to claim for himself the right to take the role of 'policeman of the Gulf'."

The three orientations which molded the character of the Cooperation Council are, in brief:

1. Oil wealth has led to direct or indirect international participation in the destiny of the Gulf. The consequences of this are enormous and political stability must be ensured by means of economic, social and cultural stability.
2. The necessity that the Gulf states participate in a practical and active way in Arab political decision-making, from which up til now these states have remained aloof, in spite of their participation in the responsibilities ensuing from it.
3. Exploiting material, spiritual and political resources to the benefit of the Gulf states group in a way that will lead to the elimination of any disputes between them.

After the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council was announced, a sensitive question was raised: What is the place of Iraq in this Council? The answer came: Iraq is currently preoccupied with its war with Iran, and

its existence in the Council was postponed on the understanding that this will happen in the future. This procedure was adopted in spite of the fact that the Gulf states have taken Iraq's side in an unannounced fashion by their financial assistance, which is now more than 18 billion dollars.

But Iran weighed matters in another scale.

The Iranian rulers found in the Gulf states' attitudes toward Iraq "a national bias" which negates the goals toward which they strove by proclaiming their revolution to be an "Islamic revolution."

A high Gulf official told me, "The Islamic character of the Iranian revolution does not differ from many of the doctrinal slogans raised in a number of Arab countries; but it has remained with no content, and in spite of that it still persists."

In the understanding of many of the people of the Gulf in the various principalities, when a revolution is Islamic it should treat its neighboring Muslim countries differently than its predecessor, which was accused of domination, racism, and not recognizing the Arabness of any part of the "Persian Gulf"!

Is this what led the Gulf countries to be wary of the Iranian revolution and to give this wariness a negative character...i.e., to keep it inside without expressing it frankly and without adopting policies which would confront the possible outcome of the revolution?

This question was posed to a Gulf "practitioner" in political affairs. He replied:

"The truth is that the prevalent belief was that the two poles of interest in the Gulf were to ensure the safety of naval traffic in the Gulf to guarantee the continued flow of oil to the world, and to ensure stability in the region to prevent the internationalization of the Gulf."

It was once felt that Iran was as concerned with guaranteeing the security of naval traffic as any other Gulf state; in fact, Iran could be even more interested in the question of shipping because it acutely needs every piastre it can get from oil revenues, especially after the reduction in the drilling and exportation of its oil, along with the horrific increase in its expenditures due to domestic demands on the one hand and the war with Iraq on the other.

Besides the importance of naval security, Iran was also more concerned than the other states with the non-internationalization of Gulf affairs, because the Gulf had become a direct target in the winds of the American-Soviet struggle. These winds encompassed it from without, and soon started to spring up from the many holes available to them from within.

The Iranian authorities reached the point of denying any role to the Gulf countries in maintaining security in the region, and even threatened to adopt

counter-measures if the Gulf states resisted its exercising a police role in the region.

In other words: Iran was the revolution which overthrew the Shah, and it is determined to exercise the same role taken by the Shah, which emanates from two inseparable beliefs: first, that the Gulf is Persian and that Persian Iran is its only guardian; second, that Iranian forces are responsible for resisting any voice that says anything different. To ensure Iranian power, the Shah's forces occupied the three islands in the Gulf, and the Shah fed the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq, to enable him to fill his incisions in the Shatt al-'Arab region.

After the fall of the Shah, it was supposed--in the belief of the people of the Gulf--that all this would change, and that the Islamic Iranian revolution would refrain from anything directly harmful to all the Gulf states. But what happened is the reverse. The Iranian authorities continued to occupy the three islands and to follow the Shah's methods in the Shatt al-'Arab. They likewise insisted on the "Persian-ness" of the Gulf, and that they alone have the right to control it. They finally plotted against the Gulf states with the goal of bringing down their organizations of government. The first failed attempt was in Bahrein.

All this has nothing to do with the nature of the priorities of the GCC.

The interest in political, economic and social stability has become secondary at present to the stability of security. This is natural, because the stability of security is what affords the necessary means for any other stability.

The Gulf states' demand to participate in Arab decision-making was followed by another orientation stating the necessity of Arab participation in guaranteeing the security of the Gulf.

But how do we provide for Arab participation while the conditions between the non-Gulf Arab states are...as we know?

Last December, 'Abdallah Bishara, Secretary General of the GCC issued a statement calling for the imposition of the Gulf character with its new Arab way of thinking. He said, "It is unjust, wrong and outrageous to impose responsibilities and participation on the people of the Gulf without soliciting their opinion and permitting them to participate in the Arab political decision-making process."

Shortly thereafter this theory experienced another rift, for one official says, "It is wrong and unjust to impose duties on the Gulf states without giving them any rights. Perhaps the most basic of these rights is that the Arab states have real participation in the defense of the Gulf and the protection of its security."

But the hesitation to demand what is described as "the right of the Gulf states with regard to the Arab states" must be seen in light of the prevailing

conditions in the Arab world. Some say, "If the Arab states are still unable to confront Israel, how can they undertake another problem imposing contingencies in conflict with the welfare and needs of these states?"

Then there are those who say, "The contradiction is to be found in the organizations existing in some Arab states and in the Gulf...and this contradiction corrupts the efficacy of any participation dealing with security or in any other cause."

'Abdallah Bishara himself said, "The Gulf demands a just solution for the people of Palestine. But what do you want us to do besides that? We have no squadrons, and the Arab world is torn. When we speak of such things we must act on the basis that we are young countries, and our ability to translate what we say into action is limited."

The Gulf states, then, know their capabilities, in contrast to the other Arab states which--according to one Gulf official--exaggerate their capabilities, and in consequence suffer defeats and remain unable to achieve the slogans they raise.

And because the Gulf states know their capabilities, and they know the cause of the misery in other parts of the Arab region, there was the urgent call to work to end conflicts between Arab states just as there was a consensus that the states of the GCC adopt the Saudi peace initiative. These two orientations emanated from a realistic look at related developments in the Arab world.

In the opinion of the Gulf states, as one high official put it:

1. The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel and Iraq's preoccupation with the war have delayed the establishment of any military moves either on the southern front with Israel, or on the eastern front. For this reason Israel stubbornly ignored demands that it retract some of the measures it had taken, although these measures impeded the achievement of complete peace in the region and at the same time contravened international resolutions which the United States itself has said were a basis for the Camp David agreements.
2. Though the disputes between the Arab states are much smaller than the fundamental problem which has robbed the Arab world of sleep for generations, the difficulty of overcoming them makes the realization of a just and workable solution to the basic problem--i.e. the Palestinian issue--impossible.
3. The fact that the Arab world is torn between those who support American policy and those who support Soviet policy in the region carries the international struggle to the Middle East. The worst thing about this is that some Arab states find themselves forced, due to the distribution of support for the policies of the two struggling camps, to adopt points of view fundamentally contradictory to the welfare of the Arabs, even if this does not develop into explicit alliance with one camp or other. This leads to sharp opposition between these Arab states, in contradiction to the welfare of the Arab nation.

4. These conditions in themselves constitute an "Arab impotence" that cannot be denied, and Arab impotence necessarily leads to the concentration of ambitions around Arab revolutions, just as Israel's ambitions concentrate around the occupied Arab territories and Palestine itself....

5. This occurs at a time when the Western world insists on the existence of a force in the Gulf that is able to guarantee stability and the maritime traffic. This insistence takes three mutually incompatible directions:

a. The necessity of protecting the Gulf from a revolution similar to that of Khomeyni by which its stability will be lost, its wealth dissipated, and the transportation of oil to the outside world impeded.

b. The possibility of Soviet intervention to protect the Gulf from the United States.

c. The possibility of American intervention to protect the Gulf from the Soviet Union.

In light of this situation, it is no longer appropriate to study ways to end the economic and commercial obstacles and the border disputes between Gulf states, insofar as study has begun to deal with the ways to guarantee the security of the Gulf by guaranteeing the least degree of Arab solidarity to confront the violent waves of ambitions the outlines of which remain obscure in view of their contradictions on the one hand, and the multitude of acting parties on the other.

On that basis, the officials in the Gulf have become firmer in their belief that the method by which Arab issues are currently being dealt with is unsound, and that the errors committed are extremely dangerous.

One Arab diplomat who has spent a long time moving among the Gulf states confided to me: "The prevailing belief now is that the danger threatening the Arab nation is mainly a result of the lack of a solution to the Palestinian question, and this is true. Or to be more exact, it was 100 percent true, but it is now only 50 percent true because the danger has distributed itself between Palestine and the Gulf. These problems are two sides to the same coin: occupied Palestine and Israel constitute a strategic obstacle between the Arab states, and the many types of threats to the Gulf constitute a freezing and draining of its wealth. Yasir 'Arafat once said something to the effect that the Arabs are entering a dark-tunnel phase. In my opinion, the danger is not in entering a dark phase so much as it is in the timing of the entrance. We are impotent and paralyzed by many dangers, not just by Israel. We are impotent and afflicted with failure due to American ambitions which use Israel as their claws, and by Soviet ambitions which leak to us by means of progressive proposals, extremist doctrinal positions, and by lost rights, plundered lands, and humiliations we cannot resist or stop. And worst of all, we still have not found a way to at least save our self respect!"

Then the Arab diplomat added, "Do you think I am unfair in this analysis? I don't think so. I want you to be fair: What was the Arab reaction to the plot that was uncovered in Bahrein and which touches all the Gulf states?"

I said, "Do the Arab states, in their present circumstances, have the ability to react with more than grief and producing a verdict of guilty?"

He replied, "If we have come to this conviction and do not try to overcome it, we can say goodbye to the world. Do you think I am being extreme when I say that the time has come to move the Arab center from the north to the south, i.e., from the traditional Arab states to the Gulf states? Let me clarify my position. The disputes between the Arab states have become, with the passing of time, traditional disputes. Sometimes they take a pivotal character, and sometimes they take a doctrinal character. But disputes between the Gulf states are no more than simple sensitivities, and a kind of provincial independence which has no place in a region with a population that is no more than that of the smallest Arab state. This leads me to say that Gulf disputes, especially under present conditions, are more susceptible to solution than the Arab disputes before which all solutions have failed in spite of the potential threats issuing from them.

"On the other hand, the best way to solve disputes between the Gulf countries is to avoid Arab interference in them. It is my belief that the solution of disputes between the Gulf countries will make these countries better able to deal with Arab disputes, especially since they possess means of putting pressure on states which provoke or insist on prolonging disputes. In other words, the Gulf states are now being called to rectify mistakes that have gone on for more than 30 years, to which the Gulf itself was almost a victim. It is broadly rumored that the Gulf is too weak to resist hurricanes. This is true, and I wish it were false. The Gulf is weak in manpower and military strength, this is true. But it is strong in its capabilities on both the Arab and international levels, and it is able to employ these capabilities in the service of the Arab cause which includes the Gulf cause. But with the transfer of dangers from the north to the south it has become necessary for the Gulf itself to take initiative, and it has become the duty of the Arab states to stand by its side and support it, or else its loss will be greater than can be compensated for with past wealth, influence or power."

I said, "You call the Gulf states to take a fundamental role in Arab politics, and at the same time you call for the Arab states to take a fundamental role in the protection of the security of the Gulf."

He answered, "This is exactly what I call for. The GCC began in a way that could be excellent were it not for the ambitions that now encompass the Gulf. It is therefore necessary, in light of present circumstances, that the GCC be a first-class defense council, relying on the strength of its identity first, and secondly on Arab support. Cooperation in the other areas will be achieved as soon as security and stability are guaranteed."

These words were spoken before the meeting of the defense ministers in the Gulf states and before the Iranian threats not to allow these states to exercise a role in policing the Gulf, even if the goal of this role is their own protection.

Today a new factor in the situation has appeared that is of extreme importance, and as a result interest in defense and protective procedures happening in the Gulf go beyond the area of the region, to the centers of struggle in the world.

9397

CSO: 4404/316

LOCAL INVESTMENT BOOM DESCRIBED

London 8 DAYS in English No 10, 13 Mar 82 pp 37, 39

[Text]

A PUBLIC SHARE issue by Bahrain International Bank (BIB) has been more than 400 times oversubscribed, with would-be investors prepared to put up \$11.8bn for the 28m \$1 shares on offer.

Although it had been clear for some weeks that the issue had attracted enormous interest — much of it from Kuwaiti investors — the final total of funds available exceeded even the highest previous estimates. Each Bahraini subscriber will be allotted 88 shares for the maximum 30,000 applied for, while residents of other Gulf states will be allotted 66 shares apiece. The difference arises from the fact that 20 per cent of the issue was specifically reserved for Bahrainis.

BIB, which is financed mainly from Kuwait, will be incorporated in Bahrain as an Exempt Company under regulations that allow a company freedom from tax liability and from the requirement of a 51 per cent Bahraini-owned majority, provided that it does not compete on the local market.

So great has been the interest in the offshore investment companies proposed under this formula, however, that the Bahrain Monetary Agency (BMA) was obliged last month to declare a 12-month moratorium on the formation of new offshore banking units and investment companies. Four share issues for offshore banks, including that for BIB, had by then been approved by the BMA.

The share allotment was worked out using a factor of .00245 for subscriptions from Bahrain and .00172 for others, plus 15 shares across the board. A total of 444,314 names were registered with the auditors handling the issue, and 419,576 subscriptions were received.

Over \$600m was deposited with the Bahrain Monetary Agency as the required 5

per cent cash margin on subscriptions, but it is estimated that investors had to find only 1 per cent from their own pockets, with the remainder financed by offshore banks.

Some western observers have been saying that anxiety in Kuwait over the Gulf war has been prompting people to transfer more assets abroad. But there is evidence to show the exact opposite trend. While some nervous Kuwaitis transferred their money abroad in the early days of the war, and others took advantage of the inflated US interest rates during much of last year, in recent months the trend has been increasingly towards repatriation of investment, back to home base.

The real estate market, like the financial market is booming. The really spectacular, colourful action is in shares, especially at the Manah, the parallel market, where transactions make those of the Bursa, the official market, look tame.

At this point, Kuwait is estimated to be the world's third shares market, in terms of volume of exchange. The level of speculation would boggle the mind of many a classically-trained economist. One example: in the summer of 1980, the Arab chambers of commerce collectively decided to launch a holding company for private projects in the Arab world, allowing for any individual Arab to buy shares. Even though the Ruler of Dubai promised to buy a significant number of shares during the subscription, the project did not really take off in the Gulf, except up to a point, in Kuwait. Over-subscription ran at about twice the allocation. A successful launching requires 10-15 times oversubscription.

At that point, the new company slipped into dormancy. A year after the subscription, its only activity had been to publish a budget and, finally, in the second half of

1981, to get around to printing proper share certificates. It had done nothing else with its money except earn bank interest on it.

Suddenly, at end 1981, the Kuwait stock exchange remembered the holding company. Prices shot up, reaching 13 times the issue price, at which point a 1-to-10 split was announced.

In discussing this example, which is only one of many, one economist told *8 Days* that all the professional stockbrokers had remained wary — especially since it was a rather vague pan-Arab idea to begin with — of the whole thing and warned their clients to stay away. The economist himself got cold feet and sold his shares with only 120 per cent profit. Now he feels frustrated.

Even the smallest investor can buy hope. The official Borsa handles the shares of about 60 Kuwaiti companies, plus a select few gilt-edges from elsewhere in the Gulf. At the Manah, other Gulf securities are traded, usually in fairly large blocks but without too much formality.

However, the ultimate in popular share-buying is the Jett, the former alfalfa market. There, every afternoon, a hundred of so Kuwaitis mill around, selling each other hope in the form of handwritten scraps of paper representing small shares (original asking price, one Kuwaiti dinar) in small local businesses. Modest fortunes are even made in the Jett.

The irrationality of the Manah boom has begun to rub off even on the usual Kuwaiti efficiency, as officials are being tempted to slip away from their offices for an hour in the morning's session. But its attraction is so powerful that it has begun to affect real estate transactions: 'key money' in Kuwait has already reached dizzy heights in all the shopping areas, the bustling *salmiyya*, as much as the city itself.

Where there is land to be sold, prices of KD10,000 (\$36,000) are not unheard of. Key money of KD50,000 to 80,000 is what the Lebanese merchants pouring into *salmiyya* to sell Italian shoes (at KD200 per pair in the snazzier shops) and French fashions are having to put up.

Perhaps the most poignant transaction of all occurred recently, close to the Manah itself. An elderly shopkeeper one day saw a prosperous businessman come into his store (2.5m by 3m) and offer him KD200,000 in key money. The old man was happy where he was and turned down the offer.

The merchant came back once, then again, each time the price went up, until it reached KD 250,000. The old man could not resist that and the deal was clinched. There is a bitter sting to this true tale: as he walked out of the store, the new owner spat at the old man. 'What a fool you are,' he said, 'I was ready to go to one million.'

BRIEFS

BONUS SHARES--The Sharjah Group, which has investments in a large number of Gulf companies, is issuing 25 per cent bonus shares worth in excess of \$33m. The group has about 70,000 shareholders, and its present share capital is over \$133m. Its rights shares amounting to over \$33m were issued at the end of last month. The group's total share capital is being raised to nearly \$200m. This decision was taken at the annual meeting of the shareholders at the end of last month. The company, which has sizeable holdings on various leading stock exchanges and bond markets, earned a profit of \$59.86m in 1981. This was an increase of 300 per cent over the 1980 figure. A cash dividend of 10 per cent, amounting to over \$39m, is to be disbursed to the shareholders, it was stated at the meeting. The group's total assets as at the end of December 1981 amounted to \$813.9m, compared to \$406.8m in 1980. Total cash deposits and bills amounted to \$534m against \$161.7m in 1980, and total investments in financial bonds and shares (both in circulation and otherwise) totalled \$153.7m, against \$106.8m in 1980. [London 8 DAYS in English No 10, 13 Mar 82 p 42]

CSO: 4400/198

EXILE REBEL LEADERS, GROUPS COMPARED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE No 72, 26 Mar 82 p 8

/Article by Klaus Natorp: "From Gailani to Rabbani. Permanent Strife Among Afghan Party Leaders in Exile"/

/Text/ The behavior of the Afghan party leaders in exile in Peshawar, Pakistan, is a sad business. Sometimes it seems as if they were totally preoccupied with infighting instead of joining against the Soviet occupation power in their homeland. A short while ago there was again some talk of organizing a united front of the main six groups. However, at closer scrutiny, this was only the attempt of three organizations to entice so many members of the other three as to finally leave the latter's leaders without any infrastructure. For the time being the attempt seems to have failed, and in the foreseeable future the political foundation of Afghan resistance will presumably remain fragmented among six parties.

The most important factors in these groups are their leaders. As usual in Asia, the personality is the program for the Afghans also; followers assemble around the leader and gradually assume the shape of a party. The name of the party is mostly unimportant; the only thing that counts is the name of the chairman. Thus it is that hardly anyone knows the names of the most important Afghan party organizations in exile; well known, on the other hand, are the names of party leaders Gailani, Hekmatyar, Khalis, Mohammadi, Mudjadidi and Rabbani.

I have listed them in alphabetical order. It would be very hard indeed to have to list them by importance. Each one claims that his group is the one, both in exile in Pakistan and among the active combatants in Afghanistan. That cannot possibly be true. Still, should we reproach those who deceive themselves and others about their situation? In Asia it is part of the game of politics to claim more power than is actually commanded. And maybe the party leaders in exile have merely lost contact with Afghan reality and lack reliable information.

As it is, the talk in Peshawar has it that it is futile to think about the importance of Afghan politicians in exile because none of them has any backing in Afghanistan. The mujahedin, active combatants, are said to disparage the party leaders in Peshawar. However, this view is contradicted by information from Afghanistan, according to which the exiled politicians do indeed have their spheres of influence in the country. It is not clear, on the other hand, whether that has any real meaning for internal Afghan resistance to the Soviet occupation forces.

Certainly, the groups of exiles do not seem to be pillars of Afghan resistance. The reputations of the political organizations and their chief leaders have been badly damaged by the continued quarrels among the leading politicians, which affect Afghanistan also and occasionally result in physical assault when one group seeks to contest another one's loot or expand its sphere of influence. Nonetheless the commanders of the mujahedin, who are permanently in Afghanistan and refuse to leave their country even temporarily, do accept aid from combat and supply groups joining them from time to time from refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan--provided such groups accept subordination to their command. Some military leaders may also have firm agreements on close cooperation with certain exiled politicians.

Most of the complains concern the men of Hekmatyar's "Islamic Party" (Hisbi Islami). They are so indoctrinated by their chairman's claim to absolute leadership that they do not keep any agreements. Hekmatyar, 34, was imprisoned for 1½ years by King Zahir Shah, went underground during the rule of his successor Daud, and arrived in Pakistan as long ago as 1974. When the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan began in December 1979, he had the best organization and most weapons, some put at his disposal by Zia-ul-Haq's predecessor Bhutto. For a while this gave him an advantage over the rival groups, but by now the other organizations have most likely caught up with him.

Theology Professor Rabbani, chairman of the "Islamic Society" (Jamiat-i-Islami Afghanistan) also has been in exile in Pakistan since 1974. Due to his intimate links with the Pakistani sister organization of the same name (which was not in Bhutto's good books), he was not so well received at the beginning. The situation changed after the change of government in Islamabad, because Zia-ul-Haq--in contrast to his predecessor--has the highest esteem for the Pakistani Jamiat-i-Islami. It is said that Rabbani's party now gets the lion's share of aid from the Pakistani military regime. Still, Hekmatyar has no cause for complaint. He and 40-year old Rabbani have issued from the Muslim Brotherhood and must therefore be counted among the "fundamentalist" orientation. Though they have recently been closely cooperating, they watch jealously over the independence of their organizations.

Allied with them for the time being is Junos Khalis, once a brother-at-arms of Hekmatyar but gradually pushed by the latter out of the Hizbi Islami. Khalis, at 61 much older than Hekmatyar and probably not treated by him with due respect, now also leads an "Islamic Party" (Hisbi Islami). A possible bone of contention is the fact that Junos Khalis, an old warrior, occasionally goes home to Afghanistan to do battle, while Hekmatyar usually lives in Peshawar unless he travels abroad to collect funds and ask for political support.

Incidentally, all Faghan politicians in exile have been in Germany at least once. For all that they should not be thought pro-Western. Hekmatyar at least would like to keep Afghanistan at a proper distance from East and West--if ever he had an opportunity to do so. Other politicians in exile also have reservations about the West. Only the "National Front for Islamic Revolution" (Inqelab-i-Mili Islami), led by Sayed Gailani, may be considered pro-Western. Gailani shows this by adopting Western dress. Although he is an aristocrat from head to foot and alleged to be a direct descendant of the Prophet Mohammed, he would rule Afghanistan with the least conservatism and theocracy. The organizations loosely linked to his, the "Movement for Islamic Revolution" (Harakat-i-Inqelab Islami) of theologian Professor Mohammadi and the "National Liberation Front" (Nedjat-i-Melli) of Professor

Mujadid however, oppose a liberal and laicized republic of Afghanistan. Mujadidi in fact advocates the restoration of the monarchy, and Mohammadi also is more likely to think in terms of a parliament of tribal elders (Loya Jurga) than of a parliamentary democracy on the Western model.

We are bound to ask ourselves how these various views are to find a common denominator in case the Russians ever leave Afghanistan. Should that happen, many people expect bloody conflicts among the Afghans. The party leaders, on the other hand, dismiss such fears by a wave of the hand: "The chief objective is to force the Soviets to retreat, after that we will see." That is what they all say, and most of them add that they do not make any claims for themselves. Only Hekmatyar does not hide his ambition to obtain the leadership. He also seems to be the only one equipped to prevail. Still, it certainly does not look now as if the Russians would ever leave Afghanistan. Not that this disturbs the Afghan party leaders in Peshawar, who are confident of ultimate victory. Their Islamic faith and sense of history (no foreign conqueror has ever succeeded in subjugating the Afghans) fill them with the unquenchable conviction that Islam and the mujahedin will win through. "Even if the fight should last 100 years." At the present time it actually looks as if resistance in Afghanistan were on the wane, while the infighting among the Afghan parties in Pakistani exile is hotting up.

The struggle takes place mainly in the refugee camps, where each group tries to buttress its position. It is said that the supply of aid tends to depend on this. Some camps get more, others less; one party has much to distribute, another less. The quantity and quality of available weapons also varies.

The party leaders are never without bodyguards and like hiding from visitors, so that it may take days before one can find them. Is that an attempt to make themselves important, or are they really in danger? Are their lives threatened by communist agents, or do they mistrust one another? Should they ever be able to return to a liberated Afghanistan, we would evidently have to expect a long lasting battle for power.

11698

CSO: 4620/31

DEMOGRAPHY POLICY NEEDED AS INTEGRAL PART OF PLANNING

Algiers EL DJEICH in French No 225, Feb 82 pp 37-40

[Article by Bahri Boubakar: "The 5-Year Plan 1980-1984: the Demographic Policy"]

[Text] The scientific and technical progress in the world during the past few decades has certainly contributed to a great degree to total or partial elimination of a number of communicable diseases (by intervention and mass vaccination). This progress has also made it possible to cure a large number of illnesses previously regarded as incurable.

However, this progress has simultaneously caused a relative improvement in the living conditions of the world's peoples, which in turn has favored rapid demographic growth particularly in the developing countries, where the rate of increase is alarming. According to some estimates, the world population is close to 4 billion. Some say this is a bad sign for humanity since the process may further worsen the already deplorable living conditions of the majority of the world population who suffer from famine, undernourishment, illiteracy, unemployment, sickness, etc.

It is worth noting that virtually all the developing countries have failed thus far to ensure adequate food supplies to meet their needs. Dazzled by the benefits of industrialization, most of them have assigned little importance to agriculture. However, some are beginning to understand this importance in view of the threat by world imperialism to use the food weapon to further strengthen and extend its hegemony.

Some writers studying the effect of demography on an economy maintain that the "demographic burden" slows down and delays the "economic takeoff" of developing countries. They conclude that this category of country spends considerable funds, to the detriment of productive investment, on meeting food needs through importation and on maintaining a high proportion of unproductive individuals: a large number of youth, nonworking women, unemployed, etc.

In reality, this explanation is not very thorough since it cites only the demographic factor in explaining the impediments to the economic evolution of these countries. Moreover, should one put all the blame on a factor

which in one period of history, the 19th century, played a dynamic role in the economic growth of France and Germany? This thesis pretends to ignore that the real hindering factors are at another level; that the economies of these countries suffered structural deformation during the colonial era and are still the victims of injustices under the present economic order. Algeria, like all the other Third World countries, is characterized by a high population growth rate, ranking among the highest in the world.

At the time of its independence, Algeria had about 10 million people. The 1977 census counted 17.322 million (18.25 million including emigration). On the eve of the launching of the 5-Year Plan, the Algerian population was estimated at 20 million, and it is expected to increase to 36 million by the year 2000.

This rapid increase in our population, which is a common feature of young states which had been the victims of pitiless colonial genocide, has been caused mainly by the following factors:

--The remarkable improvement in health services, though they are still inadequate;

--Improvement in the standard of living;

--Early marriage;

--Rapid increase in the birthrate paralleled by a decline in the mortality rate.

According to a study conducted in 1970, the birthrate is averaging around 4.6 percent and the mortality rate is 1.4 percent. The rate of population growth is thus 3.2 percent. Each year there are an average of 789,000 births, as opposed to 240,000 deaths.

Given the weakness of our economy and the various constraints which hinder it, such a growth rate could cause the failure of our efforts to achieve our objectives.

In this context, it is recommended that we concentrate on increasing the efficiency of our economy, more effectively allocating our human and material resources, and expanding and diversifying our activities to better meet the needs of the various elements of our population (see table). Also, our economy must provide additional public facilities (schools, hospitals, transportation, etc) in order to eliminate current pressures on the existing infrastructures. It must also be able to integrate every year into the working force the hundreds of thousands of young people who reach working age.

To tell the truth, past development plans have not paid sufficient attention to demographic change and its possible impact on the economic situation. In effect, planners have been assuming that the demographic problem is relative and will hardly arise if the bulk of the objectives is achieved quickly.

However, experience has taught us that we cannot leave to chance a factor as important as demography, particularly when planning to build an economy in a harmonious way.

The extent of the "demographic boom" appears very clearly when one traces its development during the 1967-1978 period. There was a population increase of 5 million, while socio-cultural infrastructures developed at a much slower rate.

This is one reason, among many certainly, why we have seen for some time a decline in the quality of public services.

The extreme youth of our population also requires other specific and very costly investments for hospital construction and training of teachers, etc.

Thus, the allocations for education and training added up to about 30 percent of the national budget during the 1970's. This is a record high percentage among world countries; it is 11 percent of the GNP, compared to 7 to 8 percent for the USSR and the United States.

At the present time, despite all the concerted efforts, some educational institutions are unable to accomodate all school-age children. The number of new applicants increases by an average of 580,000 pupils a year. In addition to the natural population increase which strains the existing infrastructures, there is the acceleration of the urbanization phenomenon to the detriment of rural areas and agriculture as regards geographic distribution of the population. Thus, 95 percent of the population occupies only 17 percent of the total area. It is concentrated in the north with an average density of 200 per sq km. This imbalance still persists in the interior of the northern regions and is worsening with time. In 1966 the density in Algiers was 1,483 per sq km compared to 2,530 currently. By contrast, the south had very low densities of 360/sq km at Ouargla, 340/sq km at Adrar, and 80/sq km at Tamenrasset, compared respectively to 250, 240, and 5 in 1966.

Considerable effort has been made during the past few years to remedy this situation. The measures have included:

- Spedded up implementation of regional development policies;
- Application of decentralization;
- Implementation of the administrative divisions.

It should be noted that these efforts have begun to show results.

Also, as can be seen from the following table, the age profile of the population is distinguished by the predominance of youth (52 percent of the population is under 18), which places a burden on the working population, who compose a relatively small 23 percent.

COMPOSITION OF THE ALGERIAN POPULATION AS OF 1 JAN 1978

<u>Age Category</u>	<u>Males</u>	<u>Females</u>	<u>Total</u>
5 yrs and under	11.3%	10.7%	22 %
5 - 14 yrs	13 %	12.5%	25.5%
15 - 17 yrs	3.4%	3.3%	6.7%
Total under 18	27.7%	26.5%	54.2%
18 - 59 yrs	19.3%	20.8%	40.1%
60 and over	2.7%	3 %	5.7%
Overall total	49.7%	50.3%	100 %

From the foregoing one can see how important it is to be fully knowledgeable about the demographic factor so as to be able to plan development in relation to available resources and the requirements for economic and social development. We should point out that no real demographic policy has ever been defined and applied. Today a demographic policy is imposing itself because the alternative is a brake on development. This policy must be related to our development programs and oriented toward fuller and better use of our human potential.

The national charter rightly stresses that population increase should be made an element of growth and progress.

Unlike the other development plans, the present plan earmarks adequate resources to develop a demographic policy. It recommends concentrating efforts on the following:

- Advancement of Algerian women, particularly in the rural environment;
- Raising women's awareness so they can be better integrated into the working world;
- Assurance of appropriate training for youth 14-17 years old who have not been able to continue their studies;
- Adaptation of training to the specific needs of the economy.

Note also that the entry of women into the working world would improve the relationship between the working people and the population as a whole, a relationship which is still rather weak. Currently, there is an increase in number of working women of about 10 percent per year. They will total 400,000 at the end of the plan period.

REVOLUTION PROSECUTOR-GENERAL INTERVIEWED IN TABRIZ

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 6 March 82 p 4

[Text] More than 10,000 prisoners will be released during the New Year.

The monarchists are responsible for the explosion in Sepah Square.

The plot of the belligerent opposition group to explode a powerful bomb near the house of Ayatollah Montazeri was discovered.

The ten-article Notice of the Public Prosecutor's office continues to be valid.

Thursday afternoon, during a trip to Tabriz Hojjat ol-Eslam Musavi-Tabrizi, the Revolution Prosecutor-General, at a press meeting in this city, answered reporters' questions relating to the establishment of the revolution public prosecutor's offices in the city regions (Shahrestan); the implementation of the law in the coming year, as well as in the revolution public prosecutor's offices; the pardoning of prisoners; the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the house occupied by members of the central staff of the opposition group; and the ten-article Notice of the Revolution Prosecutor-General.

Concerning the establishment of the revolution public prosecutor's offices in the cities that lacked them, he said: "During my few months of activities, revolution public prosecutor's offices have been established in approximately 30 percent of the remote city regions of the country, and many former public prosecutor's offices have become more active."

Regarding the implementation of the law in the revolution public prosecutor's offices, he said: "October 1981-March 1982 was devoted to the establishment of legislation in the public prosecutor's offices, and in this respect the Supreme Judicial Council and the Revolution Prosecutor-General's office were of particular concern. Some of the issues covered were: close coordination in the Public Prosecutor's office and coordination at other levels; making a 'two-phase judgment' in the case of execution and confiscation; execution of the law concerning financial affairs and the accounts of the Public Prosecutor's office; and arrest and detentions."

Pardoning 10,000 Prisoners

Concerning the pardoning of prisoners, the Revolution Prosecutor-General announced: Steps have been taken on this matter by the Supreme Court and the Prosecutor-General's office. The Prosecutor-General's office has prepared a list of the prisoners who could be pardoned, and has submitted this list to headquarters to be studied by a special committee. After the approval of the committee and the confirmation of the Imam has been received, a large group of prisoners will be released.

He added: The Revolution Prosecutor-General's office in Tabriz has sent a list of all the prisoners to headquarters and, in my opinion, and in the opinion of the magistrate of the Tabriz Court, 600 prisoners who are members of the mini-group, and others, are eligible to be pardoned, and I hope that at least 500 Tabriz prisoners will be freed in the New Year. Also, at the same time, about 6,000 to 7,000 prisoners of the Revolution Prosecutor-General's offices throughout the country will be freed and possibly with the release of prisoners from the Justice Department prison, [all together] more than 10,000 will be freed.

Monarchists' Plot

Regarding the opposition mini-group, the Revolution Prosecutor-General indicated that the mini-group had been weakened and was bankrupt and today, exactly like disappointed monarchists, they were working despondently. For example, he added, on 23 February, a bomb had exploded in the 'Eshrat Abad Square in Tehran (Sepah Square) and at the same time a car with a bomb inside had been found in the same place. Later it was found that the car belonged to Salar Jaf, and that the bomb had been planted by the monarchists. Two days after this incident, two members of the opposition group and a group of revolutionary guard brothers confronted each other in one of the streets of Tehran. As a result, one of the opponents was killed and the other was captured. After an inspection of their car, two much more powerful bombs than the previous ones were discovered, and later it was learned that one of the bombs had been intended for the Central Committee of Baharestan, and the other was to have been planted in Qom, between the house of Ayatollah Montazeri and the bridge. Therefore, it is obvious that the opposition group is following the same path as the monarchists, and they thus exemplify the similarity of their failures.

In reference to the discovery of the house occupied by the heads of the opposition group, he said: "About two months before the incident, a group of brothers came to me and said that the house belonged to the members of the opposition group, and if we pursued this matter, we might be able to find Mussa Khiabani. They asked me for a house in that vicinity, which was put at their disposal. For a month and a half they watched the traffic of the suspicious house, and then they acted. While 21 of the heads of the combatants were gathered in the house, they started their operation."

How Khiabani Perished

He added: "In that house there were a total of 21 high ranking persons of the opposition group. Of their principal members, Mussa Khiabani was renown, although Ashraf Rabi'i was of no less importance, and she was in charge of the women of the organization. There was another one called Khossrow, who was the Security Official, and the rest were on an equal level. Eighteen of them were killed instantly, and the three remaining were arrested."

Hoffat ol-Eslam Musavi added: While escaping from the secret door of the team house, Mussa Khiabani came face to face with the guard brothers (Pasdar) and was killed along side his bullet-proof car.

Prosecutor-General's Notice Is Valid During the Coming Year

About the ten-article Notice of the Revolution Prosecutor-General's office and its validity during the year 1982-1983, he said: "This notice is continuously valid and legitimate. In regard to the belligerent small opposition groups, this is certainly final, and it is impractical to say we are the same group and we are no longer fighting. Each one of them could come and repent, but a group like Mojahedin-e Khalq cannot repent and be active at the same time--they have become opponents. But we have no quarrel with other individuals, groups or organizations who are not opposing the Islamic Republic, and have accepted the terms of the Islamic Republic. I have to mention that the laws governing parties, groups, factions, organizations or societies are executed and specified in the Ministry of Interior, and are also approved in the Majlis. Groups must act according to the sanctioned laws of the Majlis.

9815

CSO: 4640/196

GOVERNMENT TO OVERSEE ALL INDUSTRIAL PLANNING

Tehran BURS in Persian 25 Jan 82 pp 1, 8

[Interview with Engineer Taheri, deputy for petrochemical affairs of the Ministry of Petroleum]

[Text] Engineer Taheri, deputy for petrochemical affairs in the Ministry of Petroleum, spoke with the correspondent of BURS concerning actions related to the Iran-Japan petrochemical complex and expansion work on the Shiraz chemical fertilizer plant. He said:

The prime minister and the Supreme Economic Council have relegated their prerogatives in talks with the Japanese to Engineer Gharazi, minister of petroleum, who will lead the Iranian delegation to the Tehran talks to be held with representatives of the Japanese Mitsui group.

Engineer Taheri added: Future talks with the Japanese will take place within the framework of the original contract, and the Islamic Republic of Iran has concurred that 15 percent of the remaining portion of the Iran-Japan petrochemical project together with damages caused to the complex by the imposed war will be made available to the Iran-Japan Company in the form of a loan from Iran, to be used within the framework of the original contract.

According to estimates by the Iranian group, the total amount of money and loan to be extended to the Iran-Japan Company as 15 percent of the remaining portion of the project, as well as war damage, amounts to 1.5 billion yen (541 million dollars).

The Japanese government, the Mitsui group and Japanese shareholders have yet to announce acceptance of the loan proposed by Iran. The date for future talks is up to the Japanese and we are expecting their arrival in Tehran. What is certain is that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fully determined to complete all industrial projects, including the Iran-Japan complex project as well as the Shiraz chemical fertilizer plant, under its own high level and careful supervision. If foreigners cooperate with us, we shall utilize them to a limited degree. The government at present has the capability and courage to undertake the projects on its own. The Petroleum Ministry's deputy for petrochemical affairs referred to expansion work on the Shiraz fertilizer plant by saying that presently eight Iranian petrochemical experts are

holding talks in London with the consortium of foreign firms which had worked on the project. The consortium, known as D.B.G., is composed of 13 European firms from which we get goods and service aid in limited technical forms. But in Shiraz we ourselves are doing the work without them and in the past month were able to move forward 1.3 percent of the project by ourselves. If they have claims for such things as insurance and worker wages owed to them, we shall pay them. In any case, we attach special importance to the project which provides the country's needs for chemical fertilizers for agriculture and will determinedly pursue the work until we get it into operation.

5854

CSO: 4640/187

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY DISCUSSES WOMEN'S VOTING RIGHTS

Voting Rights Denied

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 728, 27 Jan 82 pp 10-11

[Text] One of the most important subjects that emerged on the local scene this week was the National Assembly's discussion of a proposal by one member that women be granted the right to participate in the election of National Assembly members.

Three viewpoints emerged within the assembly. One might say that the first of these viewpoints was the natural viewpoint in this unnatural time. Therefore, this position is necessarily held by only a small minority of the representatives, numbering not even seven members. These members support equal voting rights for women while acknowledging the faults of Kuwaiti women due to social conditions. These same faults also exist among Kuwaiti men and they cannot disappear unless the framework of the practice of democracy becomes more firmly established.

Their view of democracy is sound, concentrated on broadening and deepening its base in Kuwaiti society. This view is particularly sound because of the strong conviction that Kuwaiti women have made considerable progress in participation in public life for the last several decades and this sector is no longer shrouded in ignorance and backwardness, as the adherents of the second position maintain. This second position conveys a truth while it also reflects the faults of Kuwaiti men, namely, an outmoded concept of democracy and popular participation, in particular, and a backward understanding of political life in general. Therefore, this position argues against giving women voting rights based on the watchword "social traditions" and the problem of "how to meet with women and explain electoral platforms," among many other excuses.

The last surge of this wave used improper expressions regarding women without any qualms. They compared the situation to "pimping" and used other expressions that reflect the unfortunate condition of these individuals and their outmoded understanding of democracy. They attempt to narrow the framework of the exercise of democracy through all sorts of means so they can ultimately gain a "recommendation on a transit permit," or the submission of a housing application, or some other service from which they will eventually benefit because their vote is sought on a particular matter.

This is the unnatural situation in this unnatural time, which has been turned into something natural according to the compulsory norm, just as two minuses make a plus. They are the majority who voted against granting voting rights to women.

The third position is the "silent" position whose adherents have forgotten the Prophetic tradition which says that "He who remains silent about the right is a mute devil." These are the same individuals who raise every fine point of the Islamic faith in their conversation when they want something. These are the adherents of the Islamic position, or, more precisely, the Salafist members or the Muslim Brotherhood who remained silent until it was time to vote and then raised their hands in favor of the majority, that is, against voting rights for women. They did this in spite of the traditions and truths in the Islamic faith that make clear the role and participation of women in early Islam, which were not peripheral but rather of chief importance.

For example, there is the kinswoman of (Bint Ka'b) whom the Prophet described in the Battle of Uhud: "Wherever I looked I saw her fighting below me." In the battles, the Muslim woman is depicted rallying her forces on the battlefield and fighting more savagely than some of the men. The women participated in commercial transactions on an equal basis with the men and took part in all public political affairs. All the stories from the early era of Islam reinforce this situation and there is not enough space here to examine all the facts.

These individuals remained silent about that. So long as the goal is to expand and deepen the democratic base among the people, this disturbs them greatly. If they were able to hand down a legal opinion stating that it is illegal to grant voting rights to women they would do so, as is the case with any action aimed at broadening and deepening the framework of democratic practice. Therefore, they preferred silence, content even with the theory of "pimping," and chose not to make any reply or get involved. When it was time for the vote, they revealed their outmoded positions which help to promote the conventional view of women in its most backward form and which do not represent the true nature of men in Kuwaiti society.

Women of Kuwait, even though the large majority voted against granting you political rights in this assembly, you possess significant credentials in that you occupy a high station and carry great influence. Implicit in the outcome of the voting by representatives of this kind is an assessment of you. It is enough that they voted in favor of the meetings law which imposes restrictions on the entire people and that they retained Article 35 of the law concerning printed material. Therefore, do not expect anything from them other than the logic of "pimping" and empty sayings. This includes those individuals who invoke the words of God and His Prophet and praise and call on his name, for in the end they all work toward the same end. Therefore, by the same compulsory norm, you are considered to have been given your political rights!

Assembly's Vote Condemned

Kuwait AL-TALI'AH in Arabic No 728, 27 Jan 82 p 11

[Text] The debate that took place last week in the National Assembly concerning political rights for Kuwaiti women--specifically, their right to vote--brought to mind all the tragicomic paradoxes of history. To be more specific, we are referring to the debate launched by members of the assembly and individuals who oppose giving Kuwaiti women the right to elect National Assembly members. By way of example, history reveals the story of the monks of Constantinople who debated and disputed over the number of angels who could sit on the head of a pin while the Ottoman armies were upon the walls of the city. Whatever the outcome of the discussions of those monks, the answer of the Ottoman armies was clear and final inasmuch as there was no longer any justification for the existence of the monks themselves, to say nothing of the need for such monkish sophistries.

Those who opposed voting rights for women could find no intellectual or ideological basis for their position except to cling to the catch-all of "traditions and customs," that lofty edifice that rings with the din of the many victims and sacrifices led to its alter. Political rights for women was the latest in a long series of sacrifices which are part of the repression and domestication of Arab men and his transformation into a consuming creature incapable of distinguishing between what is beneficial and what is harmful and devoid of the innate and spontaneous human feelings that would lead him to defend himself against imminent dangers.

Those who opposed political rights for women on the basis of customs and traditions and on the pretext that such rights will lead to meetings between men and women or the participation of women in election celebrations failed to realize one simple fact. This fact is that men and women in the Arab homeland can at any moment become the common property of the Zionist-American enemy. The lords opposed to political rights for women realize full well that neither they nor any of the Arab regimes have the power or strength to prevent any foreign power from attacking Arab territory and appropriating all its inviolate possessions, including the appropriation of its men before its women.

Palestinian territory, the Golan Heights, Sinai, the Iraqi nuclear reactor, and the American Rapid Deployment Forces in Egypt, Sudan, and Oman--all are geographically only a few hundred miles from us. No spot within Arab territory is any longer remote from Zionist-American aggression.

Those who understand the protection of honor in terms of preventing men from speaking to women must first of all protect the same women from threats of capture and seizure by enemies, not make it easy for enemies to invade and seize the land and people. They must resist the presence of the planned attack bases on the borders of their deserts and prevent the coming attack planes from flying through their airspace.

For those who do not know who the lords opposed to women's political rights are, consider how long the Jordanian authorities followed in your footsteps before

the West Bank fell into the grasp of Israeli occupation, meriting no more than an administrative decision by the military governor of the West Bank. When this occurred, we heard not a single voice of opposition from among the many voices which meanwhile filled the land with outcries against what they viewed as a more serious crime: women's political rights.

Representatives, we ask you: What would you do if you were confronted by a similar situation and the administrative decision that was offered not only failed to give the right to vote to women but prohibited men from exercising this right?

Truly, we will reap a bitter harvest from the legal opinions and debates of the monks of our National Assembly!

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CSO: 4404/252

AIRPORT, HOTEL RECONSTRUCTION, TOURISM ISSUES DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1323, 12 Mar 82 pp 52-54

[Interview with Marwan Hamadah, Minister of Tourism by 'Adnan Karimah; Date and Place of Interview not Specified: "Minister Marwan Hamadah Tells AL-HAWADITH about Support for Tourism To Confront the Post-War Period"]

[Text] Beirut International Airport is a "dump," a farm that is out of control; the solution lies in building a new airport.

Three hundred million pounds are required for rebuilding the hotels that have been destroyed; execution of reconstruction is waiting for the green light from security.

An Arab follow-up committee is to establish joint investment projects in the tourist sector.

Tourism is Lebanon's oil. This statement was made during the years that preceded the war in Lebanon, which has been going on since 1975. These were the years of economic prosperity and comfortable living. Revenues from tourism contributed no less than 18 percent of the national revenue. Official statistics issued by the Central Bank indicated that 1974 was the best year for tourism that Lebanon had ever had. The number of non-Lebanese citizens who entered Lebanon exceeded 3 million tourists. That was a 57.5 percent increase over 1973 figures. Gross receipts from tourism were estimated at 880 million pounds; this was an increase of 53.6 percent.

These figures emerged before the Lebanese war, but they naturally disappeared during the war. This is because tourism and war are two bitter enemies who cannot meet. How are things now that the 7-years' war has consumed Lebanon's oil?

AL-HAWADITH met with Minister of Tourism Marwan Hamadah and had a rambling conversation with him about the Lebanese war. The following interview took place.

[Question] The question that is being asked today is this: what does a minister of tourism do in times of war?

[Answer] He behaves as though a state of emergency were declared in tourism. This means that tourism, which is one of the sectors that is most sensitive in the face of events, is now being exposed to a critical or rather an extremely

grave situation. The question of the tourist sector in Lebanon is no longer that of counting on recording tourists at the airport, as official agencies used to do in the past. It is rather a question of counting tourist firms, and the counting here is done in descending order. This means we are working very hard to prevent the collapse of the tourist sector. This is the sector that was hurt the most by the Lebanese war. Naturally, it will be the first to recover after peace is restored. A state of emergency in the tourist sector will be announced, and the public sector with the support of the private sector, which owns these tremendous investments in the tourist area, will take action to turn back the onslaught of collective bankruptcy. In a state of war a minister of tourism provides support here and consolation there. He tries to provide emergency first aid to this or the other tourist facility; he reduces the burdens of fees here and the burdens of interest there. Briefly, he protects what is left of a sector that before the war used to provide 18 percent of the general national revenue. The sector that we are defending is not a small one despite the fact that Lebanon lost 38 percent of its hotel capacity in the events--the number of beds in hotels of all classes. Lebanon also lost a relatively significant number of amusement establishments, restaurants, rest areas and other facilities for tourists.

Thus, what is left of the tourist sector is significant and broad; it represents hundreds of millions [of dollars] in material and human investments. Despite the predicament, it is still one of the best tourist sectors in the Arab world. Since the best defense is [a good] offense, the work of a minister of tourism in this situation in particular is that of planning and beginning the implementation of plans that will become projects for future tourism in Lebanon.

Lebanon is suffering from a drain in the tourist sector that is not confined to material objects. That drain also includes the people who abandoned the tourist facilities in Beirut and the summer resorts [in Lebanon] and headed to the Gulf during the period of the events. These countries have experienced rapid growth in hotels and tourism in the past 7 years. We are thus being forced to face a situation wherein we have a shortage of trained manpower who must be found when we reactivate the tourist sector after the war. Thus, part of the subject is material and [the other] part is the trained and professional manpower.

Among our concerns at present is our focus on domestic tourism which plays a cultural and an educational role. Ultimately, domestic tourism will play a conciliatory role. Part of a Lebanese citizen's adherence to his land and heritage comes from his familiarity with that land and heritage. Among the modest matters which we are presently trying to accomplish are [the following]:

First, we are beginning to refurbish the palace of Amir Amin in Bayt al-Din in preparation for its reopening early next summer for tourists. This is a luxury hotel that was managed by the Intercontinental Company. We are now negotiating with that company about the possibilities of its going back to managing the hotel. If Intercontinental does not manage it, we will assume that responsibility [ourselves].

Second, we are recovering and repairing the tourist halls in the building of the Ministry of Tourism, and we are adding a new exhibition hall so that there would

be a complex of exhibition halls which can be used for one large exhibition or for several concurrent exhibitions.

Third, the youth tourist office is being developed, and a clubhouse is being furnished with guest rooms for artists or for scout leaders. Motion picture theaters are being prepared, and a small restaurant is being opened. It will serve traditional Lebanese foods at modest prices to young tourists. It will have a bookstore, an open air theater and game rooms.

[Question] You said that despite everything that happened, we were still better than any other country in the field of tourism. In what areas, in your opinion, are we better?

[Answer] First, in the quality of the hotels. Although Beirut hotels no longer bear the fancy names of world-wide companies, they are still very luxurious hotels thanks to their owners and those who work in them. They offer the best services; they serve the best foods; and they provide the best means of telecommunications in an Arab world where luxurious hotels abound. However, luxurious hotels in the Arab world suffer in most cases from service because their manpower is non-Arab. It is known that the standard of Lebanese service is very high. And despite the fact that the country is suffering from a crisis in telephone [services], overseas calls in hotels are placed quickly so that one can call any capital in the world quite easily.

[Question] Don't you think that the security situation in Lebanon makes all these points at which Lebanese hotels are better irrelevant? Are there tourists coming to Lebanon or are businessmen using Beirut as a stopover in their travels between the East and the West as was the case before the war?

[Answer] Most certainly there are no tourists except for a very small number of curious people who come to see the effects of the war. Most of these are journalists, if we can call them tourists. But most certainly businessmen do come to Beirut, and they still use it as a stopover in their travels. They also come to Beirut to do business that pertains to Lebanon and its Arab environment. You know that there is integration and interaction between the hotel sector and all economic sectors in general. The fact that some businessmen have kept some measure of activity in the hotels is largely due to the vitality of the banking sector in Lebanon and the activity of numerous merchants who act as middlemen with Arab countries.

[Question] Money, as you know, is a fundamental ingredient, especially when there are tourist establishments that are about to collapse. Regarding support, what support is the state offering these establishments to help them withstand [this situation]?

[Answer] Naturally, the state cannot pay compensation to one who lost his establishment or to one who lost his customers. This has not happened in any sector. If it had, all of Lebanon's funds would not have been enough. What matters here is that the state guarantee a few measures to alleviate the burden borne by the proprietors of tourist establishments. In other words, [the state is to do the following]:

First, the state is to facilitate all forms of business dealings for the proprietors of tourist establishments.

Second, it is to guarantee them long term loans at low interest rates for projects to develop or improve their establishments. This is taking place through the Development Bank. The state has also included tourist establishments among those that benefit from the law of paying back debts in installments.

Naturally, all of this is not enough, and we adopted some localized remedies. For example, we secured continuous communications between the tourist establishments and other state administrations through the Ministry of Tourism so as to reduce the various burdens. We are now appealing to the Ministry of Industry and Oil so we can receive fuel oil rations for the sector as was the case before the events. We are also appealing to the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications to obtain a lower rate for hotels in addition to securing communications and telephone lines quickly for these establishments. We are engaged in drafting a law that would give tourist establishments additional benefits in paying back debts in installments and repealing accumulated interest payments.

[Question] It is known that money is cowardly. Do you believe that the existing establishments are enough to meet the tourist demand, or must the setting up of new establishments be encouraged? If so, how should that be done?

[Answer] Existing establishments are most certainly enough to meet the demand for beds, for example. However, we will face a fundamental imbalance between supply and demand as soon as matters go back to normal. When peace returns, a large number of Lebanon's citizens who had left the country during the events to look for a living will come back. It is known that most of these people either lost or abandoned their homes and will need to stay in a hotel. On the other hand, Lebanon will be flooded by expatriate tourists. It's been a long time since Lebanese expatriates visited Lebanon, and we will face an onslaught from them. Some will come to see their relatives and others will come to look after their property after a long absence. Lebanon may also experience the beginnings of a movement in tourism after having been outside the area of tourist activity for several years. You know that tourists are always looking for new places. There is an entire generation of tourists who have never come to Lebanon and who may go there as soon as peace is restored. We will then face an imbalance which we are expecting. We are therefore taking necessary precautions. At present a new airport is being built over the present airport. It will accommodate the additional millions of passengers for whom we will have to provide comparable hotel accommodations. The same [principle] applies to the port. In spite of the war, we are developing the port, and we are expanding it; depending upon the projects that are available, it may be expanded further and quickly. Accordingly, we must also prepare ourselves for the post-war stage so as not to lag behind in the tourist surge because of a shortage in hotels. In this regard, therefore, we must have a practical plan, and we must enact legislation that would provide opportunities to new or renewed projects. As far as new projects are concerned, there is a considerable number of applications for permits to build tourist establishments. With regard to applications for rebuilding such establishments, the proprietors of establishments that were destroyed during the events have a definite desire to rebuild. Numerous studies were made in the

Ministry of Tourism, in the Development and Reconstruction Council and by international experts who came to Lebanon to conduct a comprehensive survey of our latent resources and our capabilities for moving ahead after the war. The studies confirmed the possibility of rebuilding the most luxurious hotels such as the (Venezia), the St George, the Hilton and the Holiday Inn in a period not exceeding 30 months. Last year we estimated the cost of reconstruction at about 300 million pounds. But because of inflation, this figure must be increased every year.

[Question] Will the state finance hotel reconstruction projects?

[Answer] It is not necessary that the state finance compensatory damages, but the state should lend hotel proprietors who wish to rebuild the funds that are necessary to do so; the loans should be long term loans at low interest. This principle was approved by the state. Last year hotel proprietors waited for the green light to submit their applications and begin work. However, no one in the public sector or in the private sector was able to give that green light after the events of 2 April 1981 and the events that ensued. The ideas and the plans are there; the financing is possible and available; and the will of the state to rebuild is definite. What remains is the green light of security. The hotels that are to be rebuilt are located in the green area in the commercial center. We cannot expose reconstruction workers, the new buildings or the refurbished buildings to new destruction.

[Question] The conference of Arab ministers of tourism which was held recently in Tunisia adopted a recommendation that a plan be drawn to stimulate the tourist sector in Lebanon. In your opinion, how will the Arabs carry out this process?

[Answer] The fourth conference for Arab ministers of tourism was a Lebanese conference in fact. The only executive decisions that were made were those that had to do with Lebanon. They were in two parts. The first part had to do with the establishment of the Higher Arab Institute of Tourism, that is, the establishment of what we may describe as a league for tourism which will be the first of its kind in the Arab world and will be based in Lebanon. This league will have an Arab regional character ascribed to it by the resolutions which Arab ministers of tourism reached at their conference, and it will also have an international character. We have obtained from the United Nations approval for consideration of the league a regional international center and for financial support. This support would be in addition to the specialized professional support worth almost 3 million dollars annually.

The second part of the conference resolutions had to do with drawing up a comprehensive Arab plan to stimulate the tourist sector in Lebanon and invite the Arab countries, their governments and the development funds in them to approve and finance projects for developing tourism in Lebanon. Naturally, this would place the ball in our court. This means that from now on we are the ones who will have to prepare projects and present them to Arab funds. The first of these projects is that of the Arab Regional Institute. We have already made the financial and economic study for it and submitted it to the Arab League for approval by the Arab Economic Council. In addition, an Arab follow-up committee has been

formed, and we hope that it will be more successful than the political follow-up committee for Lebanon. This committee consists of Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia and Morocco: that is, four countries that are considered developed in tourism. The committee will hold its first meeting in Damascus on 16 March to consider a number of projects. Among them are projects that have to do with Lebanon. We will thereby have taken hold of the Arab key to the situation, and we will then have to proceed accordingly to attract Arab funds for investment in the tourist sector in Lebanon. There are very successful precedents for that, such as that of the Kuwaiti investment in Tunisia where a mixed company was formed. It built a large number of luxury hotels on the shores of Tunisia that are filled with tourists. There is nothing to prevent Lebanon from benefiting from such support and prevent Arab capital from benefiting from such investments.

[Question] The tourist emergency that you referred to was proclaimed in Lebanon and in the Arab world, but the international aspect still remains. Where does Lebanon stand today on the map of international tourism?

[Answer] Lebanon is maintaining its presence at tourism conventions with all its capability and its energy. Of course, Lebanon is not being mentioned now in all the brochures and programs about low cost tours for tourists which are prepared every year by the major tourist companies or the major airline companies in the world. This means that we are not being mentioned in this principal line which brings in a flood of tourists for reasons that are not unknown to anyone. However, Lebanon is still maintaining close relations with these companies. For example, it invites their representatives to visit Lebanon more than once a year to talk about and prepare programs for the future and to maintain relations. All these representatives demonstrated a willingness to put Lebanon back on their programs as soon as Lebanon went back to an acceptable condition of military and political security. Naturally, Lebanon attends every tourist conference that is held in the world. Lebanon is the vice president of the World Organization of Tourism, and it is still filling that position quite appropriately. Lebanon has tourist offices in several Arab and foreign capitals; they are in nine principal capitals: Paris, London, New York, Stockholm, Brussels, Frankfurt, Cairo, Baghdad and Jeddah. We are now in the process of considering setting up new offices in the continents where expatriates live. We mean [we are considering] setting up an office in Latin America and an office in West Africa with the coordination and cooperation of the World Cultural Lebanese League so we would not miss out on what I called expatriate tourists who may be the first to come to Lebanon after peace is restored.

[Question] Air traffic as you know is an important part of tourist traffic. At present, one notices that more than one third of the foreign airlines are not operating flights to Lebanon for several reasons. Are efforts being made or are there communications to induce these companies to go back to doing business with Beirut International Airport?

[Answer] As far as the airlines are concerned, the question is not only one of politics or security; it is also an economic question. Lebanon was a principal stopover on the route to the Middle East and the Far East. With the development of world-wide aviation the stopovers on airline routes were reduced. This means that airplanes which used to fly via Beirut on their way to Tokyo by way

of Tehran and Karachi, etc., now fly over the North Pole on their way to Tokyo. Airlines that used to stop over in Beirut on their way to any capital city in the Middle East are now forced to operate an independent route to these capitals because the volume of air travel between European capitals and, for example, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Jeddah, Dhahrain, Amman or Damascus has grown. Hence, changes occurred in the methods followed by some airlines; these changes are based on economic factors. It is known that every stop for an airplane entails expenses which manifest themselves in fees and refueling [costs]. At any rate, with the exception of U.S. airlines, and also maybe German airlines, which left the scene for reasons that I think are political and have to do with security, most of the airlines which flew to Beirut still do.

[Question] There are also Arab airlines that recently suspended flights to Beirut Airport, such as the Libyan, Iraqi and Kuwaiti airlines. [What about them]?

[Answer] As far as these airlines are concerned, their reasons are purely related to safety. I cannot go after them and tell them to fly their airplanes to Beirut!

[Question] One final question that has to do with the condition of the airport, the main gateway for tourists. It has been noticed that there have been many complaints, not only from Arabs and foreigners, but also from Lebanese citizens arriving at the airport and departing from it. Why hasn't the state taken action to put an end to this complaint?

[Answer] Let me tell you briefly and frankly that the airport is a huge "dump;" it is a huge "farm" that has gone "out of control." This is something that we all agree upon. The problem begins, first, with the general loss of control that is prevalent in the country and has befallen the airport. I will not go here into the question of airport security. The airport staff is now undergoing reform, and the Council of Ministers is considering a bill that would clean up this agency and give it the ability to set matters in order to a certain extent in the future. The present airport will certainly be torn down. Laying the foundations for the new airport has begun. Accordingly, the airport that we see is one whose major portions will begin to disappear in a few months. This may be the reason why some departments are balking at hiring staff or spending money on the present airport. Besides, anything that is placed today in the airport either disappears or is damaged in a few weeks if not in a few days. The question is one of security first and morality second. People may have given up on this airport and may be looking forward to the new one. Nevertheless, we will try, and the result will be ready in 3 weeks with the setting up of a small model of what an airport should be like. It should have a tourism office that consists of an oriental style reception room, a waiting hall, small European-style areas for making telephone calls and reception offices to provide tourists with information. There should be an office for the hotel association, one for an association of car rental agencies and an office for the tourist police to monitor [traffic] and help arriving and departing passengers.

8:44

630: 4404/356

PURPOSE, PROGRESS OF NOUAKCHOTT UNIVERSITY EXPLAINED

Nouakchott CHAAB in French 5, 6-7, 11 Mar 82

[Interview with Mohamed Haibetna Ould Sidi Haiba, director of the Nouakchott University Project, by Yahifdhou Ould Sidi; date and place not specified]

[5 Mar 82 p 3]

[Text] Out of a concern to provide our readers with more information on the Nouakchott University Project, we met with Mohamed Haibetna Ould Sidi Haiba, the project's director.

As the top official in charge of the project, Haibetna, who is a professor of literature, was happy to explain the underlying reasons making the establishment of a national university appropriate at this time.

He also dwelled at length on the structures of this future great educational institution and on its future plans.

Question: Why is the Nouakchott University being established now?

Answer: The idea of establishing a national university following a long and arduous gestation period has just begun to be implemented through the actual opening of a school of arts and humanities and a school of legal and economic science. In all, there are 424 regularly enrolled students this year. An Advanced Technical Training Center (CSET) has also opened its doors with 20 students.

Very obviously, this unquestionably represents a leap forward in the ongoing process of completing the pyramid of our national educational and training system. In other words, it marks a decisive break with a part of our past--an irreversible crossing of the Rubicon of immobilism and powerlessness in the field of our higher education policy.

We must therefore consider its full impact.

The reasons behind this crucial decision are numerous, but at the same time they are convergent.

First of all, there is the national will to put an end to what has become unbearable dependence on other countries in the field of higher education. A nation that is sovereign and particular about its independence--including its cultural independence--cannot afford to send its young people abroad for their education indefinitely. Even the most disinterested international cooperation cannot substitute for national effort in this area or any other, because national effort must obey an internal logic resulting from the country's own field of possibilities, needs, and strengths with a view to development that is integrated, self-centered, and "de-alienated," as it were. Establishment of the Nouakchott University is part of that vision and of that set of dynamics.

But let us be more specific by reviewing a few significant aspects of our current situation in higher education. I think your readers will be edified.

As I am talking to you now, we have more than 2,500 students abroad. They are scattered among no fewer than 30 countries on at least four continents. The total cost of supporting that student population (scholarships, transportation costs, family allowances, medical expenses, and so on) constitutes a heavy burden on Mauritania's national budget and represents a quite sizable outflow of foreign exchange. So financially speaking, education abroad is not viable. And there are other disadvantages as well.

Pedagogically, following up and overseeing such a numerous and dispersed population is more a matter of acrobatics and prestidigitation than of methodical and planned control. The Ministry of Employment and Training and our diplomatic missions abroad are often obliged to expend boundless ingenuity just to maintain a minimum of management and prevent sometimes explosive situations.

Since we are the ones requesting help, we submit to the conditions set by the partner involved, no matter how well disposed he may be toward us--his objective conditions and his good will, because we have no choice.

The result is often training that is not adapted to our real needs, priorities and aspirations, traditions, and system of ethics, because our students bring back the mentality and behavior they have acquired, consciously or not, during their long absence from the country.

In addition, and disregarding all that, the absorption capacity of universities and institutes in other countries and of our own institutions has limits, both for budgetary reasons and from the standpoint of the number of students they can accept. The remarkable expansion of secondary education and its corollary, the sizable and continuous increase in the number of baccalaureat holders, are worsening the already precarious situation. A very eloquent comparison illustrates the trend: in 1977-1978, 226 students received their baccalaureat, but in 1980-1981 there were 800, or almost four times as many. This year we expect about 1,070 to receive their baccalaureat. And the curve is going to continue to rise, especially if the number of failures declines. For this year--1980-1981--the pass rate equals 39.33 percent.

In the face of that influx and of the need to overcome the disadvantages already discussed, there was only one solution: to establish a national university to be the privileged instrument of cultural independence, training, progress, and advancement. And that has now been done.

[Question] How was the organization of this newly established university envisaged? In other words, what is its current structure, and what is planned for the future?

Answer: The decree on the organization and operation of Nouakchott University stipulates that it is to consist of schools and higher institutes (by the latter, we mean advanced schools like the ENS [Advanced Teacher Training School] and the ENA [National School of Administration], the Advanced Technical Training Center (CSET), and so on). Because of its complexity, it would take too long to describe its general organization here. Temporary provisions govern the embryo that already exists: each school has a pedagogical officer (the potential equivalent of a dean) who, in cooperation with the administration of the ENS and the ENA, administers those schools and supervises the progress of pedagogical activities. The ENS and the ENA, as well as the ISERI and the technical lycee, are making their facilities, instructors, administrative and teaching materials, and so on available to the two schools.

That original formula has the advantage of enabling us to save money pending a final solution. And incidentally, it also justifies the name of "Nouakchott University Project." Some people see this as a contradiction in terms of reality, but the contradiction is only apparent. It is true that a part of the university has long been operating as the advanced institutes, but the two schools and the CSET do not yet have the means or sufficient autonomy to be able to operate on their own. They will still need assistance and, I would even say, affection, if by any chance they are unloved. The final objective, naturally, is to set up a complete university with its various institutes and schools in accordance with the country's priority needs.

It is up to the project management to achieve this national ambition, which, like any truly big responsibility, is both harrowing and stimulating. In the short term, all our efforts will be mobilized--and already are--for building the two schools and the university campus. (God willing, we will succeed.)

[6-7 Mar 82 p 3]

[Text] In this second part of the interview, Mohamed Haibetna Ould Sidi Haiba discusses the facilities already established and talks about the specific difficulties being faced by the university project at the moment.

Question: Are there plans for a journalism school that would be attached, for example, to the School of Arts?

Answer: I see that you are arranging charity so that it begins at home! Well, after all, why not? We have not yet considered the question, but there is no a priori reason not to.

The main pillar of a truly democratic society is a free and diversified press. In preparation for national television and the establishment of a Ministry of Information, it would not hurt to think about setting up structures for local training that could satisfy the country's need for cadres in the sector of mass media.

Question: Are the current facilities adequate for the new school year? If not, what are the plans for solving that problem?

Answer: The current facilities have more than proven their efficiency, despite certain predictions of disaster. We are not presumptuous or self-satisfied enough to think that they are ideal.

On the contrary, we are perfectly aware of their temporary, provisional, and even relatively precarious nature. As long as this transition lasts--and we want it to be as short as possible--we will continue to strengthen and consolidate those structures so that their inadequacies will be least apparent, our goal being to find a permanent alternative solution.

Question: Like any project at the start, Nouakchott University is facing certain problems. What difficulties are you facing at the moment (instructors, books, and so on)?

Answer: As you say, the new always encounters resistance or even hostility from the old. The establishment of Nouakchott University is no exception to that rule.

The "old" in question here is the force of habit, and I would say it is a bad habit in the sense that we only trust what is done outside our borders. The long-established outward orientation of our higher education has accustomed everyone to putting a quality label only on the training received in such and such a country.

Along that same line of reasoning, there is the idea that nothing can be undertaken unless all the conditions are already in place. If it were followed in practice, that maximalist notion would make any undertaking for development impossible in the Third-World countries, and that includes our country.

Administrative delays here and there and a degree of skepticism concerning everything having to do with the university project are a few of the ways in which that "sociological sluggishness" is manifested, and we must overcome it.

There are temporary difficulties, however, such as the fact that we have temporary quarters and must depend on a teaching staff intended for another institution, the lack of a well-stocked library, and lack of administrative experience on the part of school officials and the project managers. But all those difficulties will be gradually overcome thanks to the determination and unremitting work of the entire supervisory staff and the support provided by the government and the entire country.

[Text] The decision to establish a university in Nouakchott arises from a national will to eliminate dependence on others in the field of higher education. That, in substance, is the idea developed by Prof Mohamed Haibetna O. Sidi Haiba in the first part of this interview, which we began publishing on Friday 5 March 1982.

In our two preceding issues, the director of the Nouakchott University Project discussed the effectiveness of the current facilities, the local training of our national cadres, and the social consequences of the new institution.

In this fourth [as published] and final installment, Mohamed Haibetna discusses the university's role in reasserting the value of our cultural heritage.

CHAAB: Mr Director, what role can Nouakchott University play in reasserting the value of our cultural heritage and in intellectual renewal?

Mohamed Haibetna O. Sidi Haiba: By vocation and by very definition, the university is one of the shrines where the intellect is active. It is a center of intense intellectual influence where men rise to the highest peaks of knowledge, intelligence, and understanding. It is the place where they acquire a Promethean dimension that shows them to be in the Creator's image.

Great nations are identified with their universities, which time has wreathed with prestige and veneration through the ages.

The names of Al Azhar, the Sorbonne, and Cambridge--to mention only those three--have a magical sound in people's minds, and in themselves, they sum up Egypt, France, and Great Britain more than all the scholarly treatises and all the tourist folders can do.

We men of the desert and the savanna have had our famous "mahadras," thanks to whose influence we made a considerable contribution to the brilliant Arab-Moslem civilization and built within our borders an intellectual and spiritual golden age that is our pride and joy. That inestimable treasure is what you refer to as our cultural heritage--that is, our languages, culture, traditions, way of life, philosophy of existence, relationship to the cosmos or nature, and our collective memory: in a word, it is the soul, the being, or the identity of the Mauritanian people--the thing that constitutes and justifies the Mauritanian people's difference and their specific nature.

Profound Crisis

That cultural identity finds abundant and multifaceted expression in poetry, music, art, song and dance, handicrafts, folklore, architecture, and treatises on theology, law, and grammar, and in the most formal logic as well as the most absolute mysticism--in a word, in the life and history of the Mauritanian people.

Like Mauritanian society as a whole, that cultural heritage suffered the impact of colonization and then entered a profound and multifaceted crisis: an economic, social, and cultural crisis and a crisis of conscience--a crisis of civilization, to say it all.

The shock waves from that crisis are continuing to spread in the body and soul of Mauritanian society.

Its destructive--or more precisely, its "destructuring"--effects give rise to devastation, traumatism, and imbalances at the individual as well as the collective level. The result is a certain degree of helplessness--of powerlessness to understand those phenomena and control them. The reaction is to blame fate and also to continue putting colonization--a historical phenomenon that belongs to the past, although it has left harmful germs behind--on the block.

There is a difference between, on the one hand, the will to analyze that phenomenon, its consequences, and its effects lucidly in order to reorient them and correct and combat their harmful features and, on the other hand, the facile propensity to view colonization merely as a scapegoat and a panacea that is constantly waved about to explain one's misfortunes--to find an escape valve and an excuse for one's own weaknesses and one's own responsibility in tragedy and crisis.

Crisis of Civilization

Perhaps I am giving the impression that I am wandering away from the question you asked, which concerned the role of the university in reasserting the value of the Mauritanian nation's cultural heritage and in redynamizing a somewhat benumbed cultural life.

In fact, I am only digging deeper into the question by inserting it into the social problematics and historical framework of Mauritania's development. Otherwise, we could go around in circles indefinitely by talking selectively and superficially about "cultural ebb" and "cultural lethargy," two notions that reflect an imprecise analysis and understanding of phenomena that are as basic and decisive for our destiny as the crisis of civilization (including its ecological dimension) that we are currently experiencing. Westerners possess the weapon of criticism with which to face the crisis being experienced by their world and have an infinitely greater possibility of containing it than we have of diagnosing and mastering ours. They have scientific research, the press, the debate of ideas, a cultural environment favorable to creativity, clement nature, and real material comfort, even though it is constantly threatened by the jolts of an ungovernable economic machine. And especially, they have that which now constitutes their distinctive feature--their calling card and their "open sesame": an insatiable intellectual curiosity that is always alert and their deliberate and permanent optimization of two immeasurable and key resources in man: intelligence and imagination--if we are not guilty of a pleonasm in trying to dissociate the two.

Era of Light

Ancient Greece ruled the world by influencing it with all the brilliance of its intellect and the knowledge of its lyceums and other sanctuaries of philosophy, science, mathematics, drama, and poetry. The Roman legions, masters of soldiering, conquered it, but Athens, mistress of arts and law, conquered Rome, which it subjugated, tamed, and pacified in the true and noble meaning of that term. We Arabs picked up that immortal torch and raised it very high, thus driving the shadow of barbarity and ignorance away from vast regions of the globe in a formidable and lightning avalanche--such as the world had never known--under Islam's green banner (the color of humanity's hope in its salvation). Contrary to the allegations made by those who despise God's message, it was not by the sword alone but also and especially by faith and knowledge--the exaltation of the virtues of knowledge and justice--that Islam swept irresistibly over the world and instituted an era of light, scientific progress, and cultural splendor without precedent. In addition to making their own contribution, Arab thinkers translated and assimilated Greek thought and transmitted it to the West. By learning from Ibn Sina, Ibn Rochd, El Khawarizmi, Ibn Khaldoun and many others and drinking in knowledge at the universities of Salamanca, Cordoba, Granada, and Seville, the West was launched into an irreversible renaissance that lifted it forever out of the darkness of the Middle Ages, in which it had been floundering, thus throwing it into the modern era. The result is there to see, and it is eloquent. It was its universities which enabled it to make that prodigious leap forward, taking all humanity with it for better and for worse.

Refined Civilization

The Arab and Moslem decadence that followed the former splendor had many causes, including in particular the disappearance--or at least the narrower scope--of the creative spirit and the abandonment of study, research, and innovation. Intellectual curiosity and the love of knowledge gave way to laziness, sterile dogmatism, scorn for things of the mind, and prostration in the face of reality. Naturally, colonialism had something to do with it, but that does not explain everything. Neither petroleum nor the pure and simple transfer of technology are enough in themselves to insure a restoration of the Arab nation's greatness if the Arab nation does not rediscover its fabulous cultural heritage--if Baghdad, Damascus, San'a, Medina, Cairo, Tunis, Jerusalem, Beirut, Marrakech, and Chinguetti do not again become the cities of light that they were in former times thanks to their innumerable universities, mahadras, schools, religious schools, teachings, brotherhoods, and so on, which for a long period and over a wide expanse of territory made them a prodigious hive for the building of a refined, polyphonic, fruitful, contagious, and conquering civilization. It goes without saying that that renaissance and that return to sources must be perfectly integrated with the evolution of today's world, which is marked by a scientific and technological revolution that is unprecedented in the history of mankind.

There is no incompatibility--on the contrary, there is beauty and harmony--between the poetry of Abu Nowass praising the virtues of wine and love and a nuclear reactor producing energy for industry and rural electrification.

The poet and the nuclear scientist are the "Iferons" of the same alchemy--the product of the same equation--and the propitious milieu for them is the university.

I wanted to take this long detour in order to reach my starting point so that my answer to your question would take on its full meaning.

New Impetus

Nouakchott University will certainly play a role in the reassertion of our cultural heritage by creating the necessary framework for research in all fields (history, literature, geography, music, archeology, and so on), by reviving the intellectual curiosity and taste for knowledge that are well known among us, by channeling and intensifying scientific and cultural exchanges with other Arab, African, and European universities, and so on.

It will be a breeding ground for Mauritanian researchers, scientists, and intellectuals permeated with the realities of their country and the world. Cultural life, which is insignificant at present, will be able to experience a new impetus, since the university will have a stimulating effect in the fields of theater, movies, research, literary creation, publishing and bookselling, and sports.

But if it is to play that role, the university must have a favorable environment not only politically but also materially and psychologically and from the overall perspective just outlined.

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CSO: 4519/149

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

SAUDI ARABIA LINKED TO SABOTAGE NETWORK

Aden SAWT AL-THAWRAH in Arabic No 425, 21 Feb 82 p 4

[Article: "Riyadh and the Export of Terrorist Gangs"]

[Text] At the time when the people of Democratic Yemen are making arduous efforts in construction and restoration so they can build a better life for the masses of workers and toilers and [at a time when they are working hard] to build a prosperous and a happy future for coming generations, relying therein on their own modest powers and capabilities, we find people who are making evil plans for this nation which is struggling and working in silence.

The major accomplishments and the profound economic, social and other changes in the social structure provoked the resentment of gloomy reactionary forces which, despite their tremendous financial resources had achieved nothing to speak of for the masses of their people. While the people of Democratic Yemen have difficulty obtaining a loan of no more than 5 million dollars from Arab oil countries, we find people who spend 8 million dollars in one night at one of the French gambling casinos. Furthermore, they pay more than 10,000 dollars in tips for the girls who serve drinks and light cigars for his highness and his party. We cannot then expect those reactionaries, and especially Saudi reactionaries, to let these people build for themselves a happy life in peace.

Today, Aden is witnessing the public trial of a new sabotage gang [such as those which] are exported by Saudi Arabia with the cooperation of U.S. and British intelligence. These gangs blow up vital installations and destroy the economic life of the people of Yemen. It is worth noting that [members of] the sabotage gang have confessed to the fact that they were trained by U.S. experts who specialize in sabotage activities and that they received that training in Jeddah in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

However, after the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sensed that it had become involved in a large way in training mercenaries and sabotage gangs aimed against Democratic Yemen, it promptly denied its relationship with this destructive group that was captured by Yemeni security forces. But the denial that was issued by Dr Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani explained to us several matters in this situation in particular.

First, Saudi Arabia fully realizes that this operation will make the people

of Yemen open those old books that abound with tragedies which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia had backed and financed. Beginning with the "war of mercenaries" and ending with "the war of explosives" Saudi Arabia backed and financed these actions to impede the progress of Democratic Yemen, to destabilize it and to undermine its security.

Second, Saudi Arabia realizes that the failure of this gang to carry out its mission and the fact that its members were found out will increase the fury of the resentment felt by the Yemeni masses in the south and the north. This action will also turn Arab and international public opinion against it, especially in this situation in which both parts of Yemen are getting noticeably close to Yemeni unity. This is the great hope towards which millions of Yemenis in the north and in the south are striving.

Third, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia knows with certainty that the disclosure of its role in and its ties to the sabotage gang against Democratic Yemen will be tied to and interpreted in the light of the recent U.S.-Saudi military agreement which was figuratively called "the formation of a joint military committee." Saudi Arabia knows that this process--its role in the sabotage gang--will be viewed as the beginning of the role which it will clearly play in its undeclared war against the countries of the Tri-partite Treaty: Democratic Yemen, Libya and Ethiopia. Saudi Arabia knows that this destructive group is only the beginning of a long series of gory events which it is backing. According to the Arab proverb, "The flood begins with one drop."

Fourth, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia realizes that its clear ties to the sabotage gang will be interpreted as a reaction to Democratic Yemen's prominent position in the Arab world and in the world. Several international conferences were held in Aden, the capital. The most recent of them was the International Conference on the World Peace Council about the question of the Middle East and the imperialist, military build-up. This is an indication of the fact that Democratic Yemen, unlike other Arab countries in the Gulf area and in the Arabian Peninsula, has stability and security.

In the opinion of others, this is what is making Saudi Arabia finance and train a sabotage gang [to work] against Democratic Yemen. It is doing that to show Yemen as a country that has an unstable regime. This would confirm the truth of what the Saudi media have been saying about Democratic Yemen. It would also confirm the false counter propaganda, which is being put out by the media of the treacherous regime in Muscat; and it would confirm the propaganda that is being put out by western capitalist countries, especially the United States. It is for this reason or another that the Saudi response was made by the Saudi minister of information, Dr Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani. Dr Yamani is known for his contradictory statements which bear no truth to the Arab listener.

Some people say, "When Dr Yamani speaks, one should take note of the opposite of what he says to know the truth." Of course, the events of Mecca and the popular uprising in 1979 are the best indications of the contradictions the Saudi minister of information makes in his misleading statements.

In one of his statements Mr Yamani had said that "His country had no close or remote relationship with such groups."

Mr Yamani added, "Saudi Arabia does not allow its territory to be used for hatching conspiracies against any Arab country. [Saudi Arabia's attitude] is based on its faith, its values, its principles and its . . .," etc.

It was expected that the rulers of Saudi Arabia make all these statements as they usually do. "Breaking a habit would be an act of hostility." There are many examples of Saudi Arabia's intervention in the internal affairs of neighboring countries, especially in Democratic Yemen and North Yemen. Where should we begin? Should we begin with the events of (Sharurah) and (al-Balaq) or with those of (Makiras) and (al-Wadi'ah)? The people of Yemen still remember the gangs of the al-Jawf area who were financed and trained by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Do we remind the rulers of Saudi Arabia of the sabotage gangs and the gangs that planted mines on the borders of (Shabwah) governorate? [Do we remind them that] hundreds of innocent citizens were the victims of those gangs? Do we remind Saudi rulers of all this to the end of the gory series [of incidents] which Saudi Arabia backs and finances? Do we get to the gory, series of terror in North Yemen which the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is carrying out by means of tribal elements that resent the Yemeni Republic and oppose the unity of Yemen? The conspiracy that is being planned and financed by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia cannot be confined to one or several pages. Saudi Arabia is doing all this on the basis of its "faith and its principles" in addition to "the close ties that bind the citizens of the same Arab and Islamic nation."

Anyone who has been following the events that have been taking place in the area [will note that] these began with the Camp David plan and the events in the Arab area that followed it. [These included] the formation of the U.S. rapid deployment forces; the acquisition by the United States of permanent bases for these forces in the Sultanate of Oman, Bahrain, Somalia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kenya; and the Saudi plan which recognizes the Zionist enemy and which was rejected by Arab countries at the Fez summit in Morocco. Saudi statements that were made in the aftermath of the failure of the plan regarded Israel as one of the countries of the region. [It was the view of the plan] that coexistence with Israel was possible. The Saudis no longer regarded Israel as their principal enemy; in the eyes of the Saudi rulers, the principal enemy was rather the communist countries in the area. According to the Saudi rulers, [this was especially true of] Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Libya and Afghanistan. At the present stage the Islamic Republic of Iran falls into this category.

All the events which Saudi Arabia topped with the AWACS deal and concluded with the announcement that decreed formation of a joint military committee with the United States indicate in concrete terms the conspiratorial role that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is playing against progressive regimes and against the National Liberation Movement in the Arab area, especially in the Arabian Peninsula. How far will the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia go in the U.S. plan?

An answer requires a lengthy pause so that the U.S. strategic plan in the Middle East area, and especially in the area of the Gulf, can be analyzed. The aim of this plan is to create in the Gulf less than full-scale warfare and semi-policies and to find out where Saudi Arabia stands with regard to giving expression to this plan. However, we do want to remind Saudi rulers of the fateful destiny of the Shah of Iran. "...admonish the true believers; admonition will help them" (al-Dharivat: 55).

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Case: 66014 382

LAND DISTRIBUTION PROGRAM TO LOW INCOME INDIVIDUALS UNDERWAY

Riyadh AL-YAMAMAH in Arabic No 684, 15-21 Jan 82 pp 38-41

[Interview with the Mayor of Mecca, 'Abd al-Qadir Hamzah Kawshak, by Tawfiq Nasrullah in Mecca: "Land Distribution Begun for Low Income People" date not specified]

[Text] AL-YAMAMAH's correspondent flew to the holy city of Mecca to spend a few hours with its mayor, Engineer 'Abd al-Qadir Hamsah Kawshak, to learn about the projects that are underway and about the vital issues that are of concern to the citizenry, such as distribution of land and grants to university people, the presence of parks, the situation of the ancient houses, the ownership deeds, maintenance of street lights, preservation of antiquities and other important local issues.

[Question] Mr Mayor, in the past several years, Mecca has seen giant projects, both in the city and in the holy sites. Would you care to give us a brief summary of the importance of these projects and of the projects in the next municipal budget as well?

[Answer] We have both projects under construction and other projects proposed in the budget. As for projects underway, they are expropriation of property in order to improve narrow streets, budgeted at SR8 million; expropriation to widen al-Jiyad--Ri'a Bakhsh street, SR200 million; expropriation to widen Ibrahim al-Khalil street, in al-Musfalah, also budgeted at SR200 million; and expropriation to widen and asphalt al-Murah street, SR85 million. Some streets are being paved and lighted at a cost of SR400 million. A municipal garage and warehouse have been built, costing 30 million. A vegetable and meat market was built, costing SR15 million. Fencing the grounds for that cost SR30 million; fencing in the cemeteries cost SR15 million, while for a surveying and engineering study, SR3 million was budgeted. Construction of vegetable and meat markets in al-'Aziziyah, al-Rusayfah and al-'Umrah cost SR4 million, and reorganizing and enclosing public gardens cost SR120 million. Construction of commercial markets and parking lots in the area of the Holy Mosque with al-Asraf school, was budgeted at SR150 million. Buildings and equipment for a sewage disposal complex was budgeted at SR175 million, expropriation and construction of a public garden on al-'Aziziyah street, in a southerly direction in the vicinity of the Pilgrimage and Seasons Forces [Building] cost SR135 million, and expropriation and construction of a public garden on King 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Kabari street, costing SR35 million.

[Question] A great many young university people in Mecca complain about the delay in distributing land grants, which came about as a royal deed. Note that they have been applying to the municipality since 1978. What is the cause of this delay?

[Answer] The reason is that there is no land in Mecca that we can distribute to them. We have previously raised this matter with his royal highness the minister of municipal and village affairs, in order to emphasize the lack of land in Mecca for distribution to the university people as a grant. He agreed to report this to the highest authority, to obtain approval to expropriate land in order to distribute it to the grant holders. So far, we have not received a reply regarding this matter.

[Question] Where is this land located?

[Answer] The location has not yet been determined. We are awaiting approval of the money. After that, we will take legal action to purchase. While doing the purchasing, we will hold public biddings, which will give us the cheapest land closest to the city. This is for the university people. As for those with limited incomes, their problem has been solved to a considerable extent, through the efforts of his highness the Governor of Mecca Province, at the suggestion and approval of the crown prince, to designate an area in Shara'i al-Mujahedin as a grant. This is the closest area to Mecca, and the municipality at the present time, has begun to distribute the land to approximately 5000 limited-income persons. In this way, the problem of low income people has nearly been solved. The royal order stipulated that this land only be allocated to limited income people, since they have the most right and priority.

[Question] Five years ago, the municipality of Mecca eliminated the orchards in al-Musfalah, and the inhabitants expected the town to compensate them for their losses after these orchards were eliminated. However, as of now according to my information, the town has only built parking lots on a small part of this land. As for the rest, it has become a nuisance to the residents living around the area, especially during times of strong winds. What are the municipality's future plans for this area?

[Answer] The municipality implements what it is authorized to. Five or six years ago, it was authorized to expropriate it and in fact, this was done. We have been waiting for the necessary money for implementation, and the money was authorized in this year's budget. The project has been opened for bidding, and God willing in the next few months, the award will be made and construction begun. Undoubtedly, the project will be large. In this area, there will be a public garden, a large swimming pool, recreational areas, a casino, meeting rooms, a mosque, fountains and so forth. As I told you, the project is large and has been carefully studied. God willing, the people will shortly see the implementation.

[Question] One notes fewer parks and recreational areas for children and fewer beautification projects, such as large monuments, in Mecca than in other cities such as Jiddah for example. Wouldn't it be nice if the municipality built ornamental monuments on the gates of Mecca, such as the gate toward

al-Khut al-Sari'a or the gate toward al-'Umrah, or in the al-Ghazawi square, or toward al-'Adl, al-'Aziziyah, al-Shashah and the other quarters and places?

[Answer] The subject of ornamentation is one of dispute among people. Some people like them and want more of them. Some of them are the opposite and say that there is no need for this nonsense. In Mecca, we do not concentrate on ornamentation, because we have submitted this matter to the officials from the Islamic law point of view, especially when the Islamic conference was held in Mecca. The view was that there is no need to beautify Mecca, because those that enter it must bow their heads in submission and in worship. Beautiful objects might keep someone from thinking about why he came, which was worship and devotion. Nevertheless, there are some efforts being made by some people and by some municipal department heads in Mecca, who are making some modest efforts on their own. Their efforts do not represent the municipality. We do not prevent them, and we do not campaign against them. On the contrary, the door is open to volunteers. Even in Jiddah, the majority of things done are donations from people, and the ornamentation is totally aesthetic and some form of the arts.

There is no doubt that Mecca is deficient in recreation areas and parks, but of course, to work in it is the big thing. We are attempting to cultivate all the open spaces between the quarters. We have reclaimed ownership of it, and we are encouraging the municipality department heads in Mecca to fence in this land, plant it with trees, and build children's playgrounds, so that people of the quarter can benefit from these gardens. This is in regard to the gardens that serve the housing units. However, there are gardens that serve the quarter as a whole or that serve the city in general, such as the al-Zahir gardens. That has children's mechanical rides in it, similar to those in Al-Yuna Park, or something of that nature. These gardens are leased by the municipality; whoever wants to use them pays an entrance fee to visit them. This is the best of the gardens located in Mecca, Jiddah and al-Ta'if. A second garden, which is almost completed now is the Daqm al-Wabr garden. It has this name because it is located in the vicinity of the mountain of the same name. This garden cost SR12 million to build and will be open to the public. However, we have not yet agreed upon the means which will be followed in managing it, or whether it will be leased out. The matter is under study. The third garden is the al-Musfalah garden, and God willing, we shall begin construction this year. These are the authorized gardens, and there is another one Kadi, which we expect to be authorized in next year's budget. In addition, there is al-Shu'aybah park on the sea. We have extended a road there, and people use it on weekends for recreation. There are several sections in it, so that people can build recreational projects on them, such as cabanas, casinos, etc., and then they can lease them to the local people. In general, I believe that Mecca, Jiddah, and al-Ta'if are three cities that complement each other. Jiddah and al-Ta'if are park areas for Mecca, and even from the commercial point of view, like Damman, al-Khobar and al-Dhahran.

[Question] One notices many old houses in Mecca that are now on the point of collapse, such as in al-Qashashiyah, the goldsmiths' market near the Kaaba, Sha'b 'Amir, Sha'b 'Ali, Jebel Qubays, Jebel Hindi, Jebel 'Umar and others.

One also notes many large shacks, especially on the tops of mountains and along their slopes. What is the municipality's plan regarding these two matters?

[Answer] No doubt many of the old houses in Mecca are about to collapse from the engineering and health standpoint. Very few of them have any value, character or possibility of being retained for any length of time. However, if a study was made of the quarters that you mentioned, and others, you would find them unsuitable for habitation by any modern standards. This is because their true owners have left the houses, or rather, have in fact abandoned them and moved to other modern sections of Mecca, such as al-Zahir, al-Rusayfah, al-'Aziziyah, etc. These old houses were left vacant until the seasons when the pilgrims, those who make the 'Umrah and visitors live in them. This gives the kingdom a bad look. These old houses are only lived in by those pilgrims who can afford to rent them, because of their exorbitant prices, since they are close to the holy places. They are broken-down, ramshackled buildings and have no sanitary facilities or public amenities.

In addition to this, they are unsuitable for long range retention, because they are ramshackled. Very few of these houses have any cultural value that should be preserved. In fact, there are residential quarters and houses in Mecca to which no modern planning standards can be applied, since there are no services or amenities there. This is a disgrace that we must rid ourselves of. We are re-planning these quarters more effectively, widening inadequate streets and putting an end to the problem. It is rather like a person who pretties up his face and leaves the rest of his body dirty.

We have previously submitted this matter to his royal highness, the crown prince, and he has some excellent ideas, based on a development program for these quarters. As I noted, we have begun in Jebel Qubays and have eliminated many things. We will follow that with other development plans for most of the quarters near the holy places. There is coordination, on the basis that the development is in harmony with the residential process, since if residents are found, they can be moved to new residential areas built by the state. The crown prince has a comprehensive plan regarding this matter. This is regarding the old houses.

As for the shacks, this is a problem of poverty and of foreigners, who are trying to remain in Mecca. They live in the vicinity of the Holy Mosque. Of course, they are in violation and are illegal residents. The government says that pilgrims, when they come for the pilgrimage, must return to their country after fulfilling their obligation. However, there are those who violate this, since there are a large number of foreigners who are still here, whether they came today or several years ago by various illegal ways. Some of them remain near the Holy Mosque for religious reasons, some stay with the intention of working in Mecca and still others slip off into other provinces. These foreigners cannot live in modern houses, because, they are too expensive. They come to any vacant land, and live on it whether it is on the hills or on the slopes, or anywhere so long as it is cheap and not within a planning area. They make shacks and live in them. There is no doubt that this upsets the city. In fact, the old quarters in Mecca are built

on this principle and have been that way for many years. all this is included in the palm that I told you about earlier. Regarding the new point, we are preventing the expansion of this kind of thing. Committees have been established, called Committees to Eliminate Trespassing, and they have been effectively carrying out their role. Unfortunately, in the past, the process of getting documents, and even documents of entitlement, was easy, since this sort of thing was encouraged, because the result of trespassing on a shack or a wall or anything of this nature was that one could get a deed to that land and own it, despite the fact that there was a royal order to the effect that from now on, no attention was to be paid to cases of occupancy. This was issued 15 years ago, and the courts and municipalities are bound by it. However, the problem is that the courts consider the testimony of witnesses, and of course the witnesses, unfortunately, are prepared, and turn lies into truth. They testify that this thing that has been trespassed against has been going on for 20 years, instead of a month or a day. However, in general, these matters do not happen any more, since the courts and municipalities have begun to apply the legal rules and regulations that we have, in order to put an end to the trespassers and the false witnesses.

[Question] What your excellency mentioned probably explains the reason for the delay in getting deeds in Mecca, as compared with the rest of the cities. Is this something that many citizens in Mecca complain about?

[Answer] Anyone who complains about delay in getting his deed is in fact a trespasser, and his deed must be a deed of entitlement. They only bring us a deed that is a deed of entitlement, and they want the municipality's opinion of it. This person is a trespasser. What it means is that he wants a deed of entitlement that says the land is in his quarter. How can it be its quarter? Its quarter is without a permit, without any planning, without any ownership of land. That means that he is a trespasser, and the rules say that he is to be removed. If this occurred before 1967, we do not oppose it, because this was before the royal decree banning these things. We have aerial photographs, which show the old and the new. If it was in fact old, according to the aerial maps, then we approve it. If it happened after the royal order, then we reject it.

[Question] Some citizens complain about a lack of adequate maintenance for street lights in Mecca, stating that some of them are out for several days. What is your comment on this?

[Answer] We have a contract with a maintenance company, just like the rest of the municipalities. Unless defects occur, there is no need for the company to do anything. But when the company finds defects, they are repaired. Defects can be caused by burned out fuses or by another company cutting the cable. This requires several days to restore service. The maintenance company might also be remiss, but in general, the maintenance in Mecca is nothing to object to.

[Question] The process of numbering and naming streets with symbols has been established for days without success. Why hasn't the mayor's office in Mecca done anything in this regard and benefitted from other cities that have preceded it in this field, such as Riyadh?

[Answer] The process of numbering the streets with symbols is not a failure, because this is the natural situation and a true concept of the numbering process whether in regard to streets or quarters. The problem lies in the fact that these matters compete with the extent of the people's willingness to understand them. Of course, many of our citizens cannot comprehend correctly such matters as these. At the same time, it has not been explained to them. Even some of the officials do not understand this process. Any person who criticizes this process should first find a solution, except that it is easier to just criticize! Some people think that naming the streets solves the problem. I feel that just naming is not a solution, since names are already there. In Mecca, we have changed the symbol system slightly, because of the situation, even though this system is used in America and in London, for example.

This is internationally used and is well known. It is the only way; there are no other ways. With it, one can reach an address without having to ask anyone, if you understand the system. Understanding it will enable you to determine the location and to visualize it, at the same time that you receive your friend's address, if you understand how the city is divided and can understand the map. If you know that Riyadh is divided into two axes, one north-south and the other east-west, you can at once visualize the location and know where this person's house is, whether it is in the northwest or the southeast. This is much better than if I told you that I live on al-Farzduq street and you lived on 'Umaru Ibn al-'As street. What is the relationship between the two? These two streets could be adjacent or one of them could be several kms away from the other. However, when I tell you that I live on 3 North Street and you live on 4 South Street, you at once know and can visualize the distance between the two. The number system is necessary and is needed for the future, so that if a message system is put into a computer, the mail can be distributed at once without having to resort to a lot of questions.

When we began the numbering system, we met and contracted with three different consulting firms. We distributed the cities among these firms and told them to give us a full report on how to number and name our city streets. Finally, the views we received were similar. We gave the matter to a committee to pursue the system for all the kingdom's cities. This is the true situation. In Mecca, we also changed it somewhat. For example, instead of N1, we write North 1, and instead of S1 we write South 1, making it easier for people, despite the fact that they do not write the full word in America or Britain, but rather, symbolize it with letters. Apart from this system, we have also tried another method, which is to use names for those who do not understand or comprehend the first system, which is over their heads. We recognize that we have not explained this system, because the maps are not yet completed. I cannot talk about things until they are in their hands. But after these maps are finished, and the people have them, we will begin to explain this system through the local press and television. God willing, the people will clearly understand it.

[Question] One notes the presence of very narrow streets, which need widening, such as West al-Mansur St, al-Malawi St, etc. What is your view of this?

[Answer] It is true of course, because this resulted from ancient quarters or from quarters that grew through squatters or shanties and the like. The plan is gradually to develop and modernize these quarters whether through a traditional plan, which is to widen some of the streets, or through a radical plan, in which we will take a residential quarter, lay it out and rebuild it.

[Question] The present vegetable market, located in Jarul, is in bad shape and is unsuitable, in terms of its small size and disorganized condition, and the fact that there are no public amenities within it. Is there any thought to moving this market to another place?

[Answer] The market is in fact very limited. We proposed last year to build a central market or a wholesale market for fruit and vegetables. This proposal was accepted, and this matter is now up for bidding. It will be located in al-Musfalah.

[Question] The subdivision of South al-Musfalah (the subdivision of al-Ka'ki) is close in numbers of residential buildings, but so far most of the homes are without lighting and paved streets, in addition to the presence of large heaps of refuse in the midst of the villas. The residents of this quarter are still waiting for the municipality to complete the subdivision and remove the refuse dumps away from the homes.

[Answer] This subdivision is new and does not have many residents. In general, all new quarters that have been built, whether in al-Ka'kiyah or al-'Umrah or al-Rusayfah or Kadi or al-'Adiliyah, or any of the many subdivisions that have been authorized, will be completed according to plan and in accordance with the funds that we are authorized each year. We distribute them for asphaltting and lighting of streets of the new quarters, and God willing, this subdivision will have its turn shortly.

[Question] The Center for Pilgrimage Studies belongs to the King 'Abd al-'Aziz University. It is carrying out several studies pertaining to the pilgrimage, as is well known from the name of the center, in addition to the studies that we make and which the municipality has conducted. The center is studying the pilgrimage from all aspects, whether economic or from the standpoint of sheer size and numbers, and the small number of the labor force available to handle it. Just imagine a million animals sacrificed in 3 days, more than half of them during the first day, or during the first 6 hours of the first day. Think of the preparations required for this, with the demand for slaughter, skinning, cleaning and cold storage. These animals are slaughtered in 3 days. How can we prepare refrigerators, vehicles, manual labor, etc., for these 3 days, following which they will be idle for the rest of the year. This meat cannot legally be sold, but rather, it must be distributed to the poor. There must be no profit from it. Muslims themselves cause this problem; Islam is not the one that caused it. Why do we slaughter 500,000 animals the first day? There is no reason for this, because they are unable to slaughter them entirely or find poor people to eat them, so they give them to friends. Moreover, religion permits you to choose any time to make a sacrifice during those 3 days, instead of just the

first day. There is a school of thought that allows the sacrifice at the end of the pilgrimage month. There is also a school that permits the sacrifice at the end of 'Umrah.

Necessity requires that we encourage people not to dedicate the sacrifice and to do away with the sacrifice, without making use of it. With regard to the blessing, there is a school which permits one to make the sacrifice after al-'Umrah, which means that the hour will arrive and there will be no reason because he is waiting for the pilgrimage month. There is a way to solve the problem and it is permitted by the Islamic Shari'a. This is the process, and it is permitted by the Islamic Shari'a. This is the process of proxy, which has been discussed by some of 'Ulema. This is the formation of a body or authority, to which a proxy is given and money, and it does the sacrificing throughout the year. The problem requires administrative organization and a strong legal decision, in order to end this matter. As I told you, generally, speaking, the meat cannot be sold, but must be distributed free to the poor in Mecca. We previously studied this matter thoroughly, and brought in experts from the United Nations. We contracted with several consultants regarding this, and I can summarize the result for you as not being economically feasible. We welcome those who want to study the matter and tell us something new, so that the problem can be solved. This matter is difficult and worrisome. We have been studying it for 15 years. The sacrifices cannot be sold, but according to the fetwa of Shaykh Ibrahim Ibn Ibrahim the by-products can be sold. They can be processed and sold. However, the manufacturing process is also a loss and non-economical. The reason is that there are huge quantities for only 3 days, and it is not economically feasible to have machinery and equipment operating for 3 days and then shut down for the rest of the year. Moreover, the operation for those days is 10 times what it is normally.

[Question] We have recently heard about cooperation between the mayor's office and Umm al-Qura University to preserve antiquities in Mecca. How far has this cooperation developed?

[Answer] This cooperation was based on the expansion projects for some of the streets and buildings that might have some cultural heritage value that should be saved. The mayor's office and the municipal council in Mecca expressed their views with regard to preserving these things, since they are being moved from one place to another. The Umm al-Qura University expressed a desire regarding this, and we gave them a full opportunity.

As for our part, we authorized all officials, contractors and those who work for the municipality to take the opportunity to acquire anything of value that they see. These artifacts might be doors, lattice-works, water faucets, arches, etc. We previously announced to all citizens, and to any person who so desired, that they could acquire any of these things. That was done because there are so many; for example, there are so many skylights that it would be impossible for the city to save them all. Certainly, Mecca is in urgent need of a museum for antiquities. I find it strange that there has been no museum in Mecca since the old days and since the days of the Turks who built a large museum in Istanbul. More than 2 million people

come to Mecca each year to visit. If Mecca had an Islamic museum, it would be a great thing for its many Muslim visitors. However, the government has shown considerable interest lately in building a museum. According to what I have heard, there will be a museum in Jiddah and another in Mecca, whose center will be Jiyad.

7005

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RELIANCE ON SOLAR ENERGY EMPHASIZED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 92, 14-20 Oct 81 pp 91-94

[Article by Dr Ahmad Nabil Abu Khatwah: "Saudi Arabia: Solar Prospecting Has Started; Endless Uses of Endless Energy"]

[Excerpts] The sun is the source of vision, heat and food and the center of the vast universal system. Were it not for the sun, and for God's will in the first place, life would not have emerged on earth and would not have continued for centuries. Yet, there is no university in the world which offers a degree in solar science because this science is, as they say, one of the branches of physics and astronomy. However, the number of people specializing in this interesting science--solar science--has increased in recent years. In the United States alone, there are now nearly 200 experts specialized in solar issues and in how to utilize the sun as an assisting solution to the world's energy problem. All the studies conducted so far on solar energy confirm beyond doubt the abundance of this energy and the possibility of using and utilizing it in the various fields and spheres. AL-MAJALLAH presents here the second, and last, part of the solar energy file which is concerned with the spheres of utilization and the current and future problems.

The forms of solar energy can be generally divided into three main parts: Thermal power which is obtained from transforming sunlight into heat that can be used for home heating, for example; photovoltaic power, which is more complex and which relies on the use of a special type of solar cells and batteries to transform sunlight into electricity; and, finally, photochemical power which is the most complex form of solar energy. Some of the well-known applications of this energy are: (1) the photochemical fragmentation of water to obtain hydrogen, (2) its application in photography.

What is always required is to use these various forms of solar energy so that their yield may be beneficial and economically feasible at the same time. To realize these ends, the current studies in this sphere are proceeding in a number of directions, the most important being:

The process of studying and evaluating sunrays and studying the means capable of putting them to use.

The use of solar energy in the sphere of housing, especially in heating and cooling.

The formation of solar centers to generate electricity for industrial uses, for transportation and for water desalination.

The use of solar energy in the agricultural spheres, especially for pumping well water and underground water and for irrigation and cultivation.

The sphere of breaking water into its components to make use of the generated hydrogen as a fuel to power machines and engines.

The use of solar energy to generate natural gases from biomass, namely organic matter, agricultural leftovers, such as hay and wood, and seaweed.

Following is a brief review of the most important accomplishments:

Utilization of Solar Thermal Power

Solar energy is free and costs nothing. But its main problem is that it is a scattered energy and that it is not available at all times and for long durations. This is why putting solar energy to use in heating homes, buildings and water, in drying grains and in providing the low heat needed by industry at times requires that this energy be gathered, concentrated and stored for when it is needed. This requirement places heavy economic and technological burdens on the shoulders of those working in the spheres of solar energy.

The best direct utilization of the solar energy lies in the so-called passive direct design, namely to design a building in such a way so as to make it possible to utilize the sunrays submerging it in the best manner possible. The construction of masonry southerly windows at an angle that permits the sun to enter the building in winter and the construction of [outer] structures and of roofs from materials that produce good heat isolation are essential requirements. The Brookhaven National Research Laboratory of Rhode Island succeeded recently in building 30 housing units with such specifications. Such a house is called an (Ekose), which means in Latin a "house containing all the capabilities." In such a house, there are no pipes, no electrical connections, no heaters and no air conditioners. Yet, it is cool in summer and warm in winter. In Britain, there are at present 177 solar houses in (Milton Keens) area which are financed by the Ministry of Energy.

Solar Water Heaters

Water heaters operating on solar energy are the second step in utilizing solar energy. At present, these heaters are advancing constantly and rapidly. They have begun to emerge on the roofs of buildings in many parts of the world. In Cyprus, for example, the sight of such heaters has become as ordinary as that of television antennae and to the point where the Cypriot Government issued recently a decree requiring that every new house be fitted with solar heaters. The Italian Ministry of Electricity also started this year experimenting with solar heaters built into the roofs of houses to curtail the electricity consumption resulting from use of conventional electric heaters. In France, the number of such heaters tripled in 1 year and has not reached 60,000 solar heaters. This figure may seem modest in comparison with the figure the French Government

has set as a target which it aspires to achieve in the year 2000, namely the figure of 5 million solar heaters throughout the country. To realize this goal, the French public authorities have resorted to paying 1,000 francs in aid to every housing unit using solar heaters. The Ministry of Environmental Protection intends to raise the figure this year to 1,500 francs for every unit, in addition to the guarantees given to homeowners by the firms producing such units. Vocational training centers to graduate skilled workers for the maintenance and repair of solar equipment have also begun to spread. In France, there are currently more than 20 such centers which graduate nearly 2,000 technicians annually.

One of the new solar inventions for water heating is the so-called "passive water wall." This is a new invention designed by the (Owen Design) Company in Winchester, Virginia, to heat buildings. The idea of this invention is based on installing polyethylene panels, each with an area of 4 square feet, between parts of the ceiling or of the wall. After installation, the panel is filled with water and the outer surfaces of the house behind which the panel is located are painted with a granular acrylic substance. When the sunrays fall on the paint, they warm the water in the (water reservoir) which stores and preserves the heat until it is needed. When the sun sets, the stored heat is released to heat the house at a rate of 442 BTUs for every degree Fahrenheit. These water reservoirs are now available in white and gray. They can be left uncovered inside the house in order to permit the sunrays to penetrate or they may be painted or covered with wallpaper.

One of the suggestions which may become a reality is the suggestion that an area of 13,000 square kilometers of the Arizona Desert be covered with mirrors to gather solar heat and use it to heat water and turn it into steam to operate turbines that generate electricity at a capacity of 130,000 megawatts. Of course, all of this is still no more than mere ideas, considering the enormous cost (billions of dollars) and the danger of the extremely minute rays and of concentrated sunrays and their impact on the environment and on man.

Water desalination is another important sphere where solar energy can be exploited to turn saline water (be it underground water or sea water) into steam, then to condense this steam and turn it into ice and then to turn the ice into fresh water from which the salts are separated. There is at present in one of the Greek islands a solar complex with an area of 9,000 square meters to produce fresh water from sea water at the rate of 7,000 gallons daily. There is in Pakistan a similar complex with an area of 9,800 square meters which produces more than 8,000 gallons of fresh water daily. Yet, the process is still very expensive because, on the one hand, the efficiency in utilizing solar energy does not exceed 20 percent due to the factors of seepage and ray deflection and because, on the other hand, the costs of building, maintaining, and equipping a solar complex are still very high.

Interest of Arab Countries

At present, several Arab countries are interested in the issue of solar energy. We mention in particular the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, Jordan, and others. The member states of the Arab Gulf

Cooperation Council [CCC] are also interested in this issue. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has set up the National Science and Technology Center to concern itself with the applied sciences, including the uses of solar energy. There is also a similar scientific center in Kuwait concerned with these issues. The Saudi National Science and Technology Center, located in Riyadh, is currently supporting three new projects for the utilization of solar energy, namely the project to develop solar heaters through application of the principle of the thermal pipe, the project to develop a low-cost selection surface for the flat solar collector and the project for the desalination of sea water through the use of solar energy in the processes of humidification and dehydration.

Moreover, the Research Center of the Petroleum and Minerals University in Dhahran and the Saudi Educational Mission, in cooperation with New Mexico University in Albuquerque, are conducting concerted studies on the salt lakes found in the vicinity of Dhahran and of Albuquerque to utilize the salt marshes in generating thermal energy for water desalination, for home air conditioning and for implementation of the Saudi agricultural projects and installations. Salt marshes are water pools containing melted salts and having varying degrees of salinity. When the sunrays fall on these marches, they heat the water and this heat is preserved in the more saline water layers which do not permit the quick escape of heat. The capability of the saline water to preserve the heat depends on the thickness of the water layer on the one hand and on the salt concentration it contains on the other, in addition to the inability of water to communicate heat. Thus, the temperature at the bottom of such marshes may be higher than the boiling point of water. Moreover, the marshes are able to preserve the heat for several days, even when the sun is not shining. This thermal power can be exploited by building special reservoirs at the bottom of the salt pools to supply the heat necessary for various housing and agricultural projects. Scientists in Saudi Arabia and the United States have recently discovered a substitute for the ordinary table salt (sodium chloride) to "salt" water pools after having found out that ordinary salt is not suitable for use in hot climates because it melts at low rates under high temperatures. These scientists have found out that the potassium nitrates salt is more suitable for hot climates because a [warm] solution saturated with this salt is heavier than a similar cold solution. Thus, the [warm] solution always settles at the bottom, thus realizing the goal of utilizing salt pools to gather and store thermal energy from the sun.

The Kuwaiti Scientific Research Center is also conducting at present numerous studies and experiments on the use of solar energy, especially in agriculture and irrigation. Similarly, the Lebanese Scientific Services Establishment for Advanced Systems has conducted the first comprehensive study on weather conditions, temperature degrees and sunny hours throughout the year. It has also manufactured a local apparatus (Zeus) to heat home water through the use of solar energy, in addition to another apparatus to dry grain crops. In Iraq, the Solar Energy Research Center, in cooperation with the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, developed recently a new solar heater which it hopes to market locally and in the Arab world shortly.

Despite all this, the biggest economic obstacle facing the utilization of thermal solar energy, especially in private buildings and homes, is the fact that

the consumer in many countries is still compelled to pay the costs of all the installations and equipment needed for production [of thermal solar energy]. These installations and equipment are still enormously costly, unless governments intervene to subsidize them and reduce their costs.

Utilization of Sun's Photoelectric Energy

The goals of solar energy are no longer confined to heating water or homes but have gone beyond to manufacturing solar cells capable of transforming the solar energy into electric energy. The solar cells, known scientifically as photovoltaic solar cells, are the heart which transforms photo energy into electric energy, thus making it possible [part of text missing].

The solar pump will be built in the 10 Ramadan City in a few months to test its suitability under the local conditions. An example of the second type of solar pumps, which is based on transforming solar power into electric power, is a solar water pump developed recently in France. This pump consists of 49,152 solar cells divided over 192 solar energy collecting panels. The cells transform the solar energy into electricity which turns an engine that operates two underground water pumps capable of irrigating 8,000 hectares of farmland daily. There is no doubt that the success of the French experiment is bound to inspire serious hope in the developing countries that suffer from drought as a result of the lack of water. However, the most important problem facing such solar pumps is the high cost of the raw materials from which they are manufactured. The cost of the solar cells alone is more than the cost of an ordinary pump using heavy oil for fuel. But all the results of recent studies indicate that the cost of these materials will drop by a large degree on a not too distant date.

Solar Bicycle, Car and Plane

In the past few years, the uses of solar cells have multiplied. Hardly a day passes without our reading or hearing about a new invention operated by solar energy. From solar bicycles, cars and planes to ovens, refrigerators, radio and television sets, watches and computers, solar energy has become an indivisible part. For example, a bicycle developed recently in California permits the rider to shift from muscle power to solar power when travelling uphill. The rider shifts to "solar speed" and the pedals turn automatically. This has been done by fitting into the bicycle a solar panel which can be installed in all kinds of bicycles. Similarly, a British engineer, 40-year old Trevor (Fure), has been able to build a solar car which he has called (Zena) and which can run on ordinary fuel as well as "solar fuel," thus reducing its fuel consumption to less than 1 gallon per 85 kilometers. But the cost of such cars is still high (15,000 pounds sterling per car).

Moreover, the American, Paul McCrady, the father of "solar flight," was able recently to fly a distance of 300 kilometers (Paris-London) in his solar plane in 7 successive hours, at a speed ranging from 30-60 kilometers per hour and at an altitude of 10,000 feet. This relatively low altitude was chosen so that the pilot may not have to use an oxygen mask. The fuselage of the plane, weighing altogether no more than 93 kilograms, was built of a light plastic material supplied by a major U.S. firm which supervised the project from the start. The

solar plane, called Solar Challenger, was fitted with 16,000 solar cells covering most of the wings and of the tail to power a 2.7 horsepower engine, generating 3,000-4,800 electrical units (watts), depending on altitude and on the angle of the sun. The solar cells were offered free by NASA, even though the cost of a single cell amounts to nearly \$8,000. Despite the plane's success in crossing the English Channel, experts believe that the use of solar energy to power civilian or military aircraft at present is not practical but may become so one day, perhaps by the middle of the 21st century.

Moreover, the U.S. National Aviation and Space Agency is currently planning to launch solar power stations into space in the not distant future. Satellites will gather the sunrays and transmit the gathered energy to earth on extremely short (light waves). Each satellite will have two enormous "wings" covered with millions of solar cells which transform sunrays into electricity. It is said that a single station of this size will be capable of generating 10,000 megawatts of electricity, a quantity sufficient to meet the electricity demands of a big city like New York. The University of Utah, in cooperation with the International Space Agency, hopes to launch the first space vehicle powered by solar energy in 1983. Meanwhile, the British Aerobus Plants in Southwest England have produced nearly 50,000 solar cells needed to power the space station scheduled to be launched by the U.S. Space Agency at the outset of 1985.

Utilization of Photochemical Energy

One of the big potentials receiving strong attention these days is the utilization of solar energy to produce hydrogen from water. The industrial fission of water through the utilization of sunlight to produce chemical energy has now become a reality whereas it was in the past a dream in the minds of scientists. Melvin Calvin, a researcher at Berkley University in California, was able, after 45 years of ceaseless research, to uncover some of the secrets of the photosynthesis process in plants. For his efforts, he won the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1961. These discoveries contributed to several endeavors to imitate the photosynthetic process artificially through the use of several chemicals and synthetic layers similar in structure to plant cells. This issue is interesting and we must offer a quick and simple review of the process by which plants make use of solar energy and water to produce beneficial organic matter (hydrocarbons).

To complete the photosynthetic process, plants need sunlight for two operations. In the first operation, called the second photoic system, fission of the water molecules takes place through the extraction of the electrons they contain. Thus, hydrogen ions loaded with a positive charge (protons) are formed whereas oxygen is released in the form of gas into the air. The freed electrons then pass through the second operation, called the first photoic system, in which one of the important cellular compounds (Nadp) is broken down to supply the plant cell with the energy necessary to make use of carbon dioxide and to transform it into usable hydrocarbon and starch materials.

The use of industrial systems imitating the photosynthetic process in plants had made it possible to complete the first, but not the second, operation in synthesis. It is now possible to transform the positive hydrogen ions into

free hydrogen atoms that can be gathered and used as fuel for cars, aircraft and space vehicles. The hydrogen can also be used in manufacturing a countless number of synthetic chemicals, ranging from plastics, ammonia and methane alcohol to chemical fertilizers and synthetic fats. The usability of hydrogen as a fuel is due to its high energy content and which exceeds by far the energy volume found in the same weight unit of any other chemical, including benzine itself. Moreover, burning hydrogen causes no environmental pollution because what is produced by burning it is useful water. But the big problem lies in how to store hydrogen in a liquid form for various industrial uses. Liquid hydrogen requires large, heavy containers which cars or aircraft cannot carry. Moreover, liquid hydrogen is an extremely cold substance which boils at a degree of 253 below zero. This is in addition to the fact that it evaporates and diffuses rapidly. For all these reasons, there are some technical problems which a number of companies are trying to overcome by using other forms of hydrogen, such as mineral (hydrides) which are easy to store safely and securely at ordinary room temperatures. It is worth noting that nearly a year ago a BMW car powered by hydrogen fuel was displayed at the Hannover Trade Fair in West Germany. Similar projects are currently receiving aid from the U.S., German and French Governments for the production of cars and aircraft powered by hydrogen fuel.

To conclude, the research conducted so far to utilize solar energy confirms beyond any doubt that it is possible to exploit this energy in numerous spheres and fields. A French official of the Solar Energy Commission once commented by saying: In "easy times" there was the energy extracted from the bowels of the earth but in "hard times" we have no choice other than to use solar energy.

8494

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SUDAN

SOCIAL, POLITICAL FACTORS AFFECTING SUDAN DISCUSSED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1322, 5 Mar 82 pp 30-31

[Article by Nash'at al-Taghlibi: "The Price of Sugar Rose, and the People of Sudan Became Apprehensive about Bulletin Number One"]

[Text] The question everywhere is this: Why have students' demonstrations remained confined to students?

There is no opposition; there are rather opponents. The multiplicity of parties restores tribal loyalties.

When I arrived in Khartoum last week, I asked myself: "Will I see a picture [of Sudan that is] different from that about which I had heard?"

The fact is that the picture about which I had heard was a gloomy one. It was one in which things were so tangled up that untying the knots would have been impossible. The reason for this is quite simple. Some "observers" have grown into the habit of applying to events in Sudan the standards of other regions and countries at a time when the Sudanese people have their own standards which are unmatched in the Arab world.

Domestic actions in Sudan differ from those found in other Arab countries. This is due to Sudan's spaciousness, to the multiplicity of races in it; and to the tribal loyalties that are still deep-seated in Sudan. It is due to Sudan's location; to the fact that Arabism recedes gradually to the south and grows gradually to the north; and it is due to Sudan's varied nature and to the nature of its citizens who took from the desert and from the forest their love for freedom and their insistence on it. We find in Sudan moral standards that may be considered curious and illogical outside its borders.

What happened in Sudan recently was by foreign standards extremely serious. Students went out in demonstrations that lasted 3 days after which schools and universities were closed. Then a universal popular congress was held. The most notable fact about that congress was the candor of those who attended it. Occasionally, that candor bordered on harsh disparagement. This congress was followed by another within the purview of the armed forces. A decree was issued relieving the vice president and the minister of defense of all his positions and pensioning off 22 officers who have the rank of colonel and higher. A decree was also issued disbanding the Socialist Union and forming popular committees that would look into the difficulties that were tied to the actions of the

former Socialist Union. That committee was to keep those difficulties away; find a new formula for solidarity with the people; and realize the vital demands of the people.

All this could have been considered a popular uprising on the one hand; on the other hand, it could have been considered an attempted military coup.

But the picture in Khartoum was quite different.

It is true that students did go out in demonstrations, and it is true that these demonstrations were escalated, that guns were fired and some people fell victims. But it is also true that the curious phenomenon which was the subject of questions was this: why did these demonstrations remain only student demonstrations despite the fact that they lasted 3 days? Why wasn't their scope expanded to include political elements and elements who are influential in the country?

The answer to this question which I heard from many people in Khartoum gives a logical justification for the matter, albeit it is in itself astonishing and strange to traditional standards outside Sudan.

The apparent reason for the demonstrations was the lifting of the sugar subsidy and the 10 piasters increase in the price of sugar at one time.

Sugar is very important and very vital in Sudan where large quantities of tea and sherbet are consumed. But was sugar alone the reason for the demonstration, or was it the other food supply crises that actually placed sugar at the top of the list? No one is unaware of the fact that the economic crisis from which Sudan is suffering and which President Numayri has been talking about since last November, considering the Sudanese economy to be below zero, has necessarily produced numerous crises, or as the Sudanese people say, numerous bottlenecks. There was a bottleneck in the distribution of bread; there was some rationing of oil; and there was a shortage of medicine. Despite the abundance of forests in Sudan there was a bottleneck even in firewood which is used in popular ovens.

Naturally, the reasons for these bottlenecks are known: there is a deficit in Sudan's balance of trade, and there is inflation. At the same time there is a tremendous shortage of hard currency as a result of low [levels of] production and high import [levels]. Because of these conditions, a small number of people is accumulating money, and most people are seeing their pocketbooks shrinking.

All of this has produced high prices that some people have considered unbearable.

But people knew that the government for all practical purposes was not responsible for what was happening. The responsibility was shared among the Sudanese citizens themselves, who produce only very little, and the popular organizations. Chief among those organizations is the Socialist Union, a large number of whose members devoted themselves to the accumulation of fortunes. They kept a distance between them and those who elected them and their demands. The responsibility was also shared by the merchants who show no mercy to anyone and by the

friendly and fraternal countries which left Sudan alone to its troubles despite the fact that with their capabilities and their uninvested wealth, they could have provided for Sudan an opportunity, unavailable elsewhere, for making a profitable investment of its funds.

What matters is that the demonstrations did begin because the price of sugar had gone up 10 piasters.

But who was it that began these demonstrations? The answer is elementary school students who are between 8 and 12 years old!

Do those children understand the meaning of the 10 piasters' increase in the price of sugar, or are there people who are prodding them and pushing them out into the streets?

Of course the answer does not need much independent explanation.

But there is another question: who are those people who are prodding those children in secret and inciting the demonstrations?

Outside Sudan, people say: the opposition.

Inside Sudan, they are saying, "It is a group of people who do not know what they want; they do things they do not understand."

The two answers automatically let us turn to look for a correct definition of the Sudanese opposition and a sound exploration of its magnitude. This is a matter that we will return to later.

What is significant is that the demonstrations began with the elementary school students and were soon stepped up to include students of secondary schools and universities.

The fact that the demonstrations went on for 3 consecutive days was the reason why the outside world expected them to be followed by significant developments. In fact, a few observers inside Sudan wired to those for whom they make their observations affirming that "Bulletin Number One" would probably be issued momentarily.

However, these observers were not alert to the curious phenomenon that characterized the demonstrations. This phenomenon was that throughout the 3 days the demonstrations were confined to students. That is, no other groups took part in them even though demonstrations by themselves are considered a significant opportunity for spreading unrest on a broad scale and getting government involved in whatever it is avoiding becoming involved in.

Despite strict instructions that security authorities not fire on demonstrators regardless of their actions, some security personnel found themselves in the difficult situation of using weapons. It was said that weapons were used under orders from the vice president, and as a result, people were killed and wounded.

Nevertheless, the demonstrations continued to be confined to students. People would receive the demonstrations in the streets by closing down their stores to avoid suffering material losses. They would then reopen them soon after the demonstrators moved away.

Therefore, when the decision to close the schools and the universities was issued, the demonstrations came to an end and calm was restored to the streets of Khartoum.

However, the demonstrations by themselves, along with the cheers that accompanied them, which were aimed specifically at the political organization, made reconsideration of some conditions necessary.

Therefore, President Numayri called for an urgent congress at which all Sudanese citizens would be represented. All the groups and factions of the Sudanese people would be represented: from the north to the south; from the east to the west; from students to attorneys, physicians and workers; and all the active groups as well as those that ought to be active would be represented.

The Sudanese president's proposal at that congress was also inspired by the nature of Sudan. That is, it differed from any other proposal that could be made in the area. President Numayri had called the conference so that a candid discussion can be conducted of all the aspects of the disease and all the solutions that are available. He asked the conferees not to spare anyone whom they thought was in error, including the president himself.

The congress's discussions, like the demonstrations, lasted for 3 days. They were mostly characterized by sharpness and violence. Many people pinpointed the trouble spots and the sure remedy for them. Then the congress came to an end with three specific matters.

First, confidence in President Numayri was reaffirmed, and the concern with keeping him in his position was not being disputed.

Second, the Socialist Union, which had done nothing to remedy the deteriorating economic conditions or make the people aware of them, and especially with regard to revoking the subsidy for basic goods, was given a no confidence vote.

Third, popular committees were to be established to study the methods that would give the political organization the ability to undertake the burdens of representing citizens properly and providing what would guarantee their rights and protect their interests. The political organization would lend citizens a hand until they can go through that bottleneck in the economic crisis which the country is experiencing.

After the popular congress it was necessary that another be held for the armed forces.

Despite the secret nature of that congress it was learned that President Numayri, who had left to his vice president and minister of defense the task of communicating directly with the armed forces, was intent on regaining his close relations with the army and explaining conditions in the country as they are, with all the pros and cons included therein.

During the early meetings that lasted 2 days President Numayri discovered, as has been said, that there was a movement to set up political centers of power. The revolution had always been concerned about keeping the army away from those political centers of power so that it can hold on to its unity, to the strength of its solidarity and to the capabilities that would enable it to perform its patriotic and national duty fully.

The president did not wait long. He immediately issued his decree relieving the vice president of his positions and pensioning off 22 officers. Thus ended the attempt to set up centers of power. However, Sudanese circles are denying this. They affirm that the pensioning off of those officers was to some of them the result of an ordinary routine measure and that for others it was a disciplinary measure.

At any rate, when the Sudanese Socialist Union was disbanded and popular committees were formed to reconsider the political organization, "observers" too asked two basic questions.

The first question was this: Will the popular committees end up by removing from consideration the principle of a single party and replacing it with that of multiple parties, or at least with two principal parties, one of which would be the party in power and the other that of the opposition?

The second question was this: Will the Sudanese opposition be able to enjoin its existence through the discussions of the popular committees?

What is curious is the fact that it was the popular committees themselves that answered these two questions. They disregarded the principle of multiple parties for a simple reason: that of multiple tribal loyalties in Sudan. The fact that citizens of Sudan were members of many ethnic groups made multiple parties dangerous and increased the danger of divisions and disputes.

Some of these committees cited examples of what happened in the south. The revolution had broken out there under the auspices of multiple parties, and it came to an end under the auspices of a single party.

This example may be an unacceptable simplification of a situation whose backgrounds and justifications are quite remote from the question of parties and partisanship. But it is doubtless that the Sudanese people would come to a cordial agreement if they found no differences to keep them apart and provoke them were they to notice any differences. They find in parties distinctions of a sort which colonialism had tried to use once when it encouraged the establishment of parties on a sectarian or on a class basis. Violent struggles whose effects still linger ensued. It is this that leads us to the question of the opposition in Sudan.

First of all it must be said that any persons who practice their opposition outside the country far from their bases and who cannot rely on working leaders is a weak opposition that will gradually lose its effect no matter how great it is.

In the past the opposition drew its strength from the strong loyalty its followers demonstrated, not as a political opposition, but as a sectarian or a tribal opposition. Parties in Sudan had the names of the families to whom they were loyal, or they had the names of the movements which they were advocating. There was the party of al-Mahdi, the party of al-Mirghani, the party of al-Khatmi or that of al-Ittihadyyun [the Unionists]. There were [also] other small parties like the communist party and the party of the Muslim Brothers. These grew with time as a result of the fact that they separated themselves from their class or sectarian loyalty.

This means that traditional parties were weakened as a result of the increase in the power of ideological parties. Traditional parties did not become strong, and when the communist party tried to seize power, it was pursued and harassed. When the Muslim Brothers came to an agreement with the government, the inclination appeared to draw inspiration for new legislation from Islamic law within a context that would not spoil national unity.

In other words, after the communist party was weakened--if that weakness still exists, since communism has become accustomed to practice its activity underground and not show its strength until it becomes strong--and after the relationship between the Muslim Brothers and the regime developed, traditional parties no longer had any power to speak of. First, this is because their leaders chose to practice their opposition from outside the country, and, second, because relations between those leaders and their supporters at home had become lukewarm for several reasons. The most important of these, for example, is the social development that affected these supporters. It gave them a kind of independence of which they had been deprived when they were blindly loyal to their "feudalist" leaders. This means that citizens who had been working only for their feudal leader, offering him everything they were producing and satisfied with the little that he was giving them found out after going through the process of social development what it meant for a person to be master of his own will and owner of his own crop. They were no longer willing to go back.

Hence, traditional Sudanese opposition no longer had any influence to speak of after the May Revolution except within the limits of what it was publishing and declaring outside the country. The new opposition inside the country pre-ferred positive action. It contributed to the popular committees where it expressed its opinions with candor that to strangers to Sudan may seem astonishing, but to the Sudanese themselves appears self-evident and natural. We had said that the Sudanese people acquired [a sense of] freedom from the nature of the desert and from the nature of the forest. They had practiced that freedom in the context of what societies have agreed to consider democratic practice.

On the basis of that fact it may be said that there is no opposition in Sudan now in the well-known sense of that term. There are opponents, however, and those opponents oppose the regime from within the regime. This means that as long as they have the opportunity to express and defend their opinions and try to persuade others of them, why should they replace positive action with negative action?

The question that is being posed now is this: Why have the Sudanese people refrained from taking part in the students' demonstrations, and why did they let these demonstrations express themselves only?

Why did they stay away?

I asked many people this question, but I did not get a convincing reply from them. However, most of the people agreed that people's negative response to students' demonstrations was due to fear of the future.

No one is unaware of the fact that the presence of an economic crisis was considered to be the justification for the demonstration, but no one excluded the possibility of asking the question: Is the regime directly responsible for this crisis? That is, has the regime committed the errors that led to the crisis? This question was followed by another: let us assume that this regime has come to an end, what will replace it?

The answer to the first question spread the responsibility for the crisis among the real officials. Some of them are inside the country, and some are outside the country, not excluding the fraternal Arab countries.

The answer to the second question presented numerous possibilities. The best of these was extremely bad and was considered by many to be "an adventure of uncertain outcome, especially under the conditions that exist around Sudan, from Libya to Chad all the way to Ethiopia and Somalia."

The fact is that recent developments in Sudan have produced two facts that cannot be ignored.

The first is that Numayri's presidency is not being disputed; it is rather considered a safeguard that cannot be relinquished.

The second fact is that everything else has to be reconsidered, provided that it produce national unity that can confront the crises and deal with them until God should provide relief.

Many people are expecting this relief after 2 years or at the most, after 3 years. It will then become possible for Sudan to invest its oil wealth and pave the way for the possibility of having its other resources invested.

8592

CSO: 4504/236

1982 BUDGET EXPENDITURES ANALYZED

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 36, Mar 82 pp 58, 59

[Article by Sami Ahmad: "The Trends of Syria's 1982 Budget"]

[Text] Eighty-nine percent of the increase in the general budget is due to an increase in investment spending. 16.7 million pounds for running expenses, and 16.5 million pounds for investment outlays. Investment in agriculture and in extraction and conversion industries to be focused on.

Appropriations for the 1982 draft general budget amounted to 33.34 billion Syrian pounds distributed as follows: 16.5 billion Syrian pounds in appropriations for investment outlays and 16.7 billion pounds in appropriations for running expenses. This is compared with appropriations of 31.19 billion pounds for the 1981 budget distributed as 16.513 billion pounds in appropriations for running expenses and 14.506 billion pounds in appropriations for investment outlays. This indicates that 89 percent of the increase in the 1982 budget is due to the increase in investment outlays.

The contents of the 1982 draft budget may be clarified by reviewing the following points:

1. Revenues earmarked for financing running and investment appropriations, compared with the 1981 budget and the underlying assumptions of the fifth 5-Year Plan.
2. Appropriations earmarked for investment projects and running expenses, compared with the 1981 budget and the underlying assumptions of the fifth 5-Year Plan.
3. The most important underlying causes of the 1982 budget and their effect on economic development in Syria.

Investment Revenues

Budget estimates for 1982 and the financial plans of organizations, corporations and public establishments that have an economic character were considered and

discussed with financial officials and directors of planning in all the economic agencies of the public sector. Production plans for 1982 and actual spending for 1981 were excluded [from the discussion]. We refer here to the fact that the 5-Year Plan stipulated an increase in investment revenues at a rate of growth of 12.8 percent annually [calculated from] the base year of 1980. Investment revenues in 1982 realized an absolute increase of 540 million [pounds] over what was planned. Thus, the rate of increase over the rate of the plan was 14.79 percent. If we were to add the increase realized in current revenues, the total increase would almost amount to 3 billion pounds. This is an indication of a significant development in the present economic policy of the Syrian Arab state. The following table indicates the ratio of the surplus in each sector to the total economic surplus.

<u>Name of the Sector</u>	<u>1981</u>	<u>1982</u>
The financial and banking sector	8.2 percent	8.5 percent
The commercial sector	3.7 percent	4.5 percent
The economic facilities sector	5.0 percent	6.3 percent
The industrial sector	6.9 percent	10.6 percent
The oil sector	69.3 percent	60.9 percent
The agricultural sector	1.1 percent	1.2 percent
The public installations sector	5.8 percent	8.0 percent
Total	100 percent	100 percent

1982 Budget Appropriations

1. Running Expenses

Appropriations earmarked for running expenses in 1982 were estimated at 16.75 billion [pounds] compared with 16.51 billion [pounds] in 1981.

In a report to the prime minister's office about the necessity of realizing mandatory savings of 10 percent, actual spending amounted to 16.21 billion [pounds]. This is a decrease of 300 million pounds from original appropriations. Thus, the increase between 1982 estimates and actual spending in 1981 was about 357 million [pounds] or a 3.25 percent rate of increase.

It is worth noting that the fifth 5-Year Plan stipulated a special rate of growth for running expenses of 6.4 percent per year. However, the rate of increase in the aforementioned appropriations amounted to 1.43 percent with regard to 1981 appropriations and 3.25 percent with regard to actual spending in 1981.

2. Investment Outlays

Appropriations for investment outlays amounted to 16.5 billion [pounds], compared with 14.5 billion in 1981. Investment outlays included expenses necessary for the administrative sector, which have to do with restoration, with the value of equipment, the acquisition of some land, requirements for technical schools and other similar things.

Appropriations were earmarked for shoring up capital; their aim was to increase the capital of corporations and enable public sector organizations achieve their

estimated production plans in 1982 and, accordingly, realize the surpluses set aside for development.

Investment Projects

Investment projects had the largest share of appropriations in the 1982 draft budget so that the objectives of the fifth 5-Year Plan can be realized. In determining the appropriations for the projects of the public sector's investment program for 1982 the necessity of completing projects whose implementation had begun, and especially those that will be put into operation in 1982, was stressed. In addition, the completion of other projects which had been begun was to be expedited, and consideration and implementation of new projects was to be begun in the context of realizing the production and services goals that had been laid out in Syria's economic and social development plan. Sectors that manufacture goods monopolized 45 percent of total 1982 appropriations, compared with 43.4 of total 1981 appropriations. But related services sectors obtained appropriations that amounted to 23.9 percent of total appropriations for 1982, compared with 23.2 percent of total appropriations for 1981. The services sector obtained 27.7 percent of total appropriations for 1982, compared with 29.7 percent of total appropriations for 1981.

It is worth noting that the ratio of investment projects that were implemented in 1981 was good, rising to 57.7 percent of 1981 appropriations. Savings that have to be realized are to be taken into consideration; these amount to 10 percent and 84.1 percent after reducing the aforementioned savings. It is known that average implementation ratio in past years was around 65 percent.

Hence, some sectors exceeded the aforementioned implementation ratios in 1981. The implementation ratio in the extraction industry amounted to 97 percent; to 94 percent in the conversion industry; and to 85 percent in the services sector.

The foregoing [observations] indicate that the 1982 budget was based on fundamental principles, the most important of which are [the following]:

1. The realization of a better proportion between local resources and expenditures in the general budget and between them and the GNP.
2. Increasing local resources for commerce and investment.
3. Curbing running expenses and making investment outlays commensurate with the achievement of basic production and service goals in the various sectors.
4. Restoring the balance between running expenses and investment outlays.

facts indicate that the increase in revenues which from 27.49 percent in 1981 to 38.73 percent in 1982 is attributed to the GNP. It is known that the plan stipulated that this ratio be increased from 26.1 percent in the base year to 37.9 percent in 1985.

The ratio of spending to the GNP dropped also from 51.29 percent in 1981 to

46.18 percent in 1982. It is known that the plan stipulated that this ratio be set at 33.9 percent in the base year, 1980, and at 54.2 percent in 1985.

Appropriations for investment outlays were earmarked for the agricultural sector, for the extraction and conversion industries and for the electricity, gas and water sector. These sectors were given the necessary appropriations so they can be strengthened and material production increased. Consequently, their contribution to ensuring consumer goods, participating in exporting and ensuring foreign currency would be increased. Finally, reference must be made to the rate of growth from 1981 to 1982 which amounted to almost 7.5 percent.

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INTERVIEW WITH OPPOSITION LEADER AHMED BEN SALAH

Tunis AL-RA'Y in Arabic 22 Jan 82 pp 4-5

[Interview with Ahmed Ben Salah, opposition leader in exile, by Hamadi ibn Sa'id: "This Is Ahmed Ben Salah in 1982"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] My interview with Mr Ahmed Ben Salah took place in a European city which is known for its moderate climate, its clean environment, and its natural beauty. These surroundings appeared to have a positive effect on the interview and to give it an atmosphere which was both relaxing and cheerful. This enabled us to delve into--without having to worry about time or other considerations--various subjects such as history, poetry, the theater, and music, in addition to political questions dealing with Tunisia, Morocco, the Arab world, Poland, etc. Concerning all of these subjects Mr Ahmed Ben Salah expressed his opinions and ideas with clarity, frankness, and a great deal of belief and enthusiasm.

Astuteness, intelligence, and enthusiasm are among the traits which characterize the personality of Ahmed Ben Salah. One thing about him which has definitely changed is his facial features. The effects of age, prison, exile, and being in the opposition have made his hair white and caused his forehead to become wrinkled. Also, the necessity to disguise himself has led him to grow a thick grey mustache which has somewhat changed the cheerful face which we were used to. All of this inspired me to ask the first question as follows: "First I would like to ask you how you are. Why am I asking this? Because people usually think or want to believe that a politician should become exhausted not only when he exercises power but also when he is active in the opposition. Whoever reviews your life story sees that you spent 12 years in the labor union movement and political struggle before independence, approximately the same amount of time in the government [after independence], and another period of time just as long in the opposition. So when I ask you how you are, I am bearing in mind that I am asking about the condition of a man who has gone through all of this."

He answered me in a fashion which suggested that he wanted to put my mind at ease because I had a sense of urgency in my eyes when I was looking at him: "I am fine. I can even say that I am in very good shape. Naturally everything is subject to being exhausted. But the exercise of power develops

human capacity. The same thing is true as far as being in the opposition is concerned. These two things are subject to being exhausted, but the same thing is not necessarily true with the people who exercise the power and who are active in the opposition. The reason for this is that people maintain their vitality by maintaining their ideas and their strong will to continue to reject injustice. And believe me, rejection of injustice provides a person with a lot of power. But this is not the only thing. The vitality and activity which I spoke of constitute a capacity which does not weaken when one resists injustice. It is as if this capacity regenerates and renews itself in order to suggest solutions and in order to fight for other things."

"So many injustices and transgressions have occurred in our country, because of the arbitrariness of our government, that many people--and not necessarily only those in the opposition--have reacted strongly. And this is not all. There are those who today are a part of the regime but who no longer feel that they can either support it or cooperate with it. All the injustices which have occurred have been greater than the educational, cultural, economic, and social achievements. And finally I would like to say that [human] capacity does not become exhausted because it feeds off the weakness of others."

This statement has some truth to it. But one thing is sure, and that is that Ahmed Ben Salah has never known exhaustion. He was full of vitality when he was running our country's economy throughout the decade before last. I wanted to know his assessment today of the experiment of the sixties after so many years have gone by, especially since, as we know, the passage of time makes the process of assessment easier. It seems that my question in this regard did not please Mr Salah in terms of how it was phrased. His answer was as follows:

"It was not an experiment because Tunisia was never a laboratory which was put at our disposal. We--and when I say 'we,' I mean all of those who had any degree of authority, whether in the leadership or among the rank-and-file--decided to pursue a policy which was called 'the policy of planning, gradual socialism, and the building of a new Tunisian society.' This policy was to be based on education, culture, and on an economy which, in turn, was to be based on three sectors which, by virtue of the fact that they were mutually limited and regulated, were supposed to provide the country with a great impetus in the fields of production, regulation of our actions, and improvement of our conduct."

"This, then, was the policy. It was a policy which differed--and this is something which people forget--from the policy which was followed during the first post-independence years which, economically speaking, were nothing more than a continuation of the colonial period."

"In any case, this policy continued for 10 years. I think that a person makes mistakes during a long period such as this. The only person who avoids making mistakes would be a person who is not active and undertakes no action. Therefore I say that the greatest mistake that can be made is the mistake of inflexibility or inaction. But during that decade we were bustling with activity. Everybody was glad to make his contribution toward our work, and

did so with great enthusiasm. Let me add with a bit of poetic feeling and romanticism that we were pursuing a beautiful dream--which was to make Tunisia a model for the countries of the Third World. Let me remind you that the expression 'the Third World' was not known in those days to the degree that it is known today. We were, practically speaking, at that time the first country--and in this regard we even preceded Egypt--to create a policy for overall development which was both organized and planned. There already was the Indian experiment, the policy of which was being put into practice by Nehru. But in Africa and the Middle East we were the first ones who acknowledged the possibility of applying a form of socialism in another developing country--in a country which only a few years before had been a colony. The socialism which we were striving to put into practice was tailored to the peculiarities of our country, on the one hand, and it also had the objective of continuously distributing the authority to make decisions in order that the source of such authority be from the rank-and-file--and I believe that the rank-and-file is the real source of democracy. This was a policy rather than an experiment. I believe that mistakes in comportment were made. They were made due to reactions [on the part of people]. In any case, as far as I am concerned I believe that I no doubt made mistakes. But I believe that the mistakes which I made were not basic and essential mistakes. That is, they were not of the type which put the existence of the nation or society in danger. On the contrary, our policy was one of adaptation of Tunisian society in such a way as to make adaptation of the government something which would be inevitable."

"Yes, the policy of the sixties deviated from its original orientation. Some people claim that Ahmed Ben Salah was the one responsible for this deviation. This is a mistake. History will say that it was another person who caused this policy to deviate and follow another course which was atrocious."

I was so surprised that I interrupted him and said: "Then Ahmed Ben Salah played no role in the hasty efforts to bring about reforms?!"

He immediately answered: 'That is right. In fact, I worked as hard as I could to have the reforms be brought about gradually. What I said concerning this matter is recorded in official documents, and history--even official history--will not be able to deny this. However, a person could imagine that this haste [to introduce reforms] originated with the noble aim of trying to go through these stages more quickly. I personally believed in this [policy of gradual introduction of reforms] because of my sense of discipline, for one thing. Also, I believed that this policy would enable us to keep going forward rather than backward. But at this point I would like to ask why, if good intentions really were present, was it not realized that things were going too fast and that mistakes had been made? Why was no initiative undertaken--within the framework of the country's establishments and organizations and in accordance with their needs--to hold a meeting during which it would be decided to correct the course taken once and for all, and to correct it in its essentials without creating a crisis atmosphere?'

I was astounded once more, and said to him: "Why did this not happen?"

He sighed and said: "It was the fault of the government in Tunisia, and this is the nature of Tunisia's government."

Actually I was expecting an answer such as this one. I was saying to myself that the question of [Tunisia's] government was the eternal question. I remembered a saying by Ibn Abi al-Dhiyyaf which was as follows: "Government is sterile and does not give birth to anything." Then I brought up the subject of the seventies (part of which Ahmed Ben Salah spent in prison, and the remaining part of which he spent in exile). I approached this subject as follows: "The policy of the seventies exploited convenient circumstances (the rains, rise in prices on exported goods, and increase in tourism), and also exploited the fruits of the great efforts which had been made during the preceding decade. Nevertheless, this policy resulted in failure and bloodshed. We have dealt, as far as we are concerned, with the causes of this failure in the meantime. However, what in your opinion were the causes [of this failure]?"

Ahmed Ben Salah answered without hesitation: "It was a matter of choices. The choice was made to have a policy of development which was not really a policy of development. A deceptive delusion was chosen. What happened was that efforts were made to concentrate on the illusion of development in an effort to disguise the desire to enrich a certain social category. The deficiency created by the seventies was a deficiency which can be interpreted as follows: The gains of the sixties--which were achieved due to great efforts made by the government and the people in the realm of financing and as a result of tightening belts and making many sacrifices--instead of being consolidated and developed in the direction of achieving universal employment and [better] distribution of goods and services, were channeled toward monopolistic activities [and enterprises] by developing the so-called 'services sector' and opening up the doors [of Tunisia] to superficial foreign financing which neither feeds [the country], keeps it from being hungry, nor is beneficial to Tunisia in any way. On the contrary, it only exploits the country."

The result of this deficiency was the fact that the country became more subordinate to foreign countries, whereas it is claimed that the country was in a position of subordination [to foreign countries] during the sixties as a result of the large amount of financing which it got involved in. It is sufficient for a person to review the official statistics put out by the current regime to realize the truth of the matter concerning the amount of borrowing and the interest rates which Tunisia is paying. Naturally, one must consider the fact that the circumstances of the two periods were different. We were active in a period when everything was beginning, a period when the basics of development and industry were being learned, a period of modernization of agriculture, the establishment of educational institutions and structures, etc."

Today, as far as our debts are concerned, the fact is that all of our cultural resources together are unable to cover even 80 percent of the interest payments on the loans. The greatest adventure which was engaged in by the government during the seventies was the dreadful step backward which

led to bloodshed. The most dangerous step backward was what happened in the sector of education. This step backward was engaged in and taken by men who today hold the reins of power. I remember that when I was minister of national education the percentage of pupils who graduated from primary school and went on to secondary school was from 42 to 43 percent. This percentage went down to from 23 to 24 percent during the seventies. Even though some improvement was recorded by the end of the seventies, this improvement has still been insufficient." There is no doubt that Ahmed Ben Salah is a socialist. But socialism nowadays has become a doctrine which is flexible in terms of concepts and contains various facets. This fact led me to bring up this subject with him. I said to him: "I would now like to ask a question which is very important because it will help to clarify some matters. There are many people in Tunisia--in spite of their particular political affiliations--who claim to follow the doctrine of democratic socialism. You also are inclined toward this school of thought. Could you please define your concept of democratic socialism today after you have had the opportunity to both contemplate and act in accordance with [democratic socialism] both when in power and when outside the government?"

He sighed and looked out toward the horizon as if he needed to collect his thoughts. Then he said: "Before attempting to define the concept of socialism, I believe that it is necessary--and this is something which is fundamental--to deal with the subject of government. This is a matter of structure and organization. It is a matter of how the government behaves, what the structures of government are, etc. In my opinion, the question is not merely a political one. The reason for this is that Tunisia today senses an urgent need to have a lengthy period of time in which moral values will predominate."

"There is a type of prevailing behavior today which is at variance with even the simplest requirements of patriotism and the simplest rules which must be respected by any country which is endeavoring to emerge from a state of backwardness. Fighting backwardness does not mean establishing a political class of people who exploit the situation in order to monopolize power and wealth. This is the type of behavior which has done harm to the credibility of the political regime in Tunisia and has either caused its achievements to have been done in vain or else caused them not to be utilized as they should be."

"Otherwise, my view is that socialism is either democratic or else it is not socialism. Socialism is linked to democracy. But the democracy which it is linked to is not merely democracy in form, that is, democracy with election ballots or a multiparty system. Real socialism is socialism which should be based on economic democracy and on the distribution of the authority to make decisions, at least as far as matters in everyday life are concerned. Socialism should be cast in the form of economic structures which, as much as possible, prevent exploitation, speculation, and monopolization of power, wealth, or capital, whether the capital is intellectual capital, economic capital, or political capital."

"My belief is that Tunisia, 4 or 5 years after it gained its independence, began to pursue the road of this type of socialism. It possessed all of the

necessary potential for achieving this type of human socialism and democracy, although it would have most certainly found this to be a difficult path to follow and perhaps would also have had to pass through a stage of authoritarian rule and tightening of belts. However, it was possible for such action to proceed and develop by means of the introduction of the necessary ministerial reorganizations, modifications, etc. It was possible, first of all, to establish peace by means of following peaceful approaches of government rather than following approaches which were capricious or destructive. Socialism does not accept approaches such as this."

"Some of the current officials [in the Tunisian government] are claiming that 'Ahmed Ben Salah has never been a socialist,' and they have written letters to this effect to some of my friends who are leaders in foreign countries. People such as this do not even know what socialism is. Their ulterior motive is to isolate and destroy Ahmed Ben Salah. This also is the type of thing which has nothing to do with socialism."

"Socialism requires a great deal of political courage. This is what was lost during the years 1969 and 1970."

"Socialism means development for the sake of reorganizing society so that there will be more justice and in order to achieve cultural development, human development, civilizational development, and the development of [human] progress. In short, socialism means everything which has the objective of making humanity more noble. In this connection we should bear in mind that the economy is nothing more than a tool for serving society. And education is a condition which is more important than the economy because education is the basis which creates the economy. This is what socialism is!"

"On the formalistic and external level it was our opinion--and this was our unanimous decision at that time--that the formula of the three sectors and organizing them in a certain way could have achieved what we call 'competitive socialism.' This is socialism which does not eliminate the spirit of competition, nor the spirit of initiative, and which has each sector compete with the other two sectors and keep an eye on them at the same time. Naturally, when we talk about the three sectors, we do not mean for one of them to be deflated and for the other two to be inflated. Those who are acquainted with the real facts, who tell the truth, and who do not lie, know for certain that this is the type of development and change which we adhered to in order to have this concept of socialism be embodied. Even the state sector was supposed to develop and change either in the direction of a formula of competition or cooperation or in the direction of new structures which would make the [governmental] establishment more human and more flexible with regard to conducting [the affairs of government]."

"The main question concerning socialism today in Tunisia is the question of individual morals and the question concerning political structures and structures of government. Socialism cannot be achieved by means of individual action. In the past we were totally convinced that the historical dimension of the President of the Republic of Tunisia would provide him with an incentive to share power and distribute it rather than accumulating it in his hands."

After this reply, in which the past and future horizons were intertwined, I wanted to bring Ahmed Ben Salah back to either the present day or the very recent past, that is, I wanted to ask him about the recent elections. I said to him: "You were one of the prominent people who were absent during the recent election referendum in Tunisia. Now these elections have already taken place, and they have turned out to be a farce. What political conclusions have you reached concerning this process?"

He answered heatedly: "Yes, we were absent. The Movement of Popular Unity [MUP] was absent for one simple reason. We were absent because we have not regained any of our rights. I am inclined to believe that we were not in a position to participate because [lack of success in] regaining our political rights was not the only reason why we were absent. There were other essential reasons for our absence. There were reasons of a negative nature and reasons of a positive nature."

"1. Negative reasons. There were no guarantees to provide for the integrity of the election process simply because everything was decided in so short a time. Then there is the question of why these elections were held. Was it decided to hold the elections because there was a desire to bring about change? Nobody said that there was. The only thing said was: 'Things have never been better, and the party is in the best possible shape.' In this regard, I am not going so far as to expect the Destourian Socialist Party to engage in a process of self-criticism. But the fact remains that the decision to change the deputies [in the National Assembly] had nothing to do with a desire to make political changes or to make changes in the structures of government or even in methods of government. In short, there were none of the normal guarantees which are supposed to be present on such an occasion."

"2. Positive reasons. In spite of these negative elements, it was our opinion that the elections were an opportunity to bring about a change in the government. [The possibility of] this change existed in the framework of the bloc of nationalists and socialists, all of whom could have criticized the deceptive election process and come forward with a plan for profound change which would have expressed our country's development and the degree of our people's awareness. But neither of these two things happened. We explained our point of view to all of our friends who participated in these elections--or at least to all of those whose point of view is not essentially different from ours. However, they preferred to participate in the process and not to lose this new opportunity to wage battle which was provided by the elections."

"In any case, I believe that, in spite of everything, this was something which was positive. The Tunisian people were able to hear something different for a change, and they were able to hear new voices and different trends. What was even more positive about it was the fact that the Tunisian people voted en masse against the regime. Herein lies the reason for the failure of this process. For the lists of government candidates, the results were very poor in comparison with the confident attitude which the regime and its supporters expressed to people abroad. I believe, then, that it was a process which demonstrated to everyone--including the largest supporters of

the Tunisian regime--how dissatisfied the masses are. Not even one opinion was expressed which supported the manner in which the election process took place. On the contrary, everyone was angry at how blithely the authorities openly falsified the election process. This only confirms the truth of our point of view that the important thing is [to change] the structure and nature of the government. This is what leads us to say that it might be necessary--and that it is always necessary, in order to have the country avoid explosive changes--that everyone--both those in the opposition and those in the regime in its current form--realize the necessity of having a national dialogue in order to assess all of the conditions of our society as well as a number of our society's political, social, economic, and educational establishments."

I interrupted him and said: "Would you include everyone in this dialogue?"

He immediately answered: "Yes, there would be no exceptions of any type. And [the dialogue should] especially be above the level of baseness which contributes to hatred and rallies some people to take sides against others just to satisfy their passions."

At this point I recalled an interview with Ahmed Ben Salah which I had read several weeks previously in the newspaper AL-NIDAL AL-ISHTIRAKI [the Socialist Struggle]. I said to him: "Recently in a Paris newspaper I read that you said something more or less along the following lines: 'It might be possible for the Tunisian regime to regain its integrity once again if it got rid of its non-peaceful elements such as fascists, reactionaries, exploiters and speculators.' Do you still believe this?"

His question appeared to have perturbed him a bit. He quickly answered: "I do not believe that these were my words. But what I always say is that in Tunisia, and in the very core of the ruling party itself, there are a lot of healthy elements. That is, there are patriots who are conscious of the growing injustice, conscious of the lack of creditability enjoyed by the Tunisian regime in Tunisia, and also conscious of the great damage caused by the political practices which are still being followed today--in terms of political policy, educational policy, economic policy, and social policy. They are also conscious of the growing deception which has replaced the repression and which has become a form of repression utilized by those who are in power. All of these people, both those in the opposition and those in the Destourian Socialist Party, might accept or even be happy to have the formation of a new government--a transitional government which would really be capable of establishing a national dialogue to deal with a series of problems which will concern the Tunisia of tomorrow. No one person alone can tell what tomorrow will be like. We must seek inspiration from the development of the Tunisian nation, from the aspirations of the new generations, and from our knowledge of the negative aspects which we have either created or sometimes caused to surface. A national dialogue is what will enable the country to avoid explosive changes."

I was surprised by Ahmed Ben Salah's moderation. I said to him: "I tend to be conciliatory, whereas there are those who wish to picture me as a marchist who is striving to create instability in the country."

you as an anarchist who is striving to create instability in the country. What is your view about this?"

He answered excitedly: "There are those who are attempting to spread this idea among the ranks of the authorities and the people in the government. My opinion in this matter--and this opinion is shared by my foreign friends who have heard the above--is that this may be a means of paving the way for an operation to be mounted against me. Those who say such things are not able to claim that I am not a patriot or a good Tunisian. Tunisia does not belong to just one person. Tunisia is the country of all of those who have remained loyal to the Tunisian nation, Tunisian culture, Tunisia's history, and Tunisia's struggle. I believe that I, at all times during my life, have been one of these people. I am a Tunisian, and I will fight to remain a Tunisian and will struggle to secure the future of my country."

It is evident from what Ahmed Ben Salah said that he is being persecuted and that some people in the government are trying to awaken doubts concerning his patriotism. I asked myself whether or not this would lead to a desire on his part to take revenge. Then I hastened to ask him: "In view of this, do you always believe that it is necessary to introduce profound changes, which the country's condition requires, by peaceful and non-violent means?"

He answered very quietly, and in a manner which suggested that he understood what was behind my question: "Yes! Changes should take place by peaceful means because changing a regime in violent fashion means leaping into the unknown. But effecting change within a peaceful framework enables a person to become acquainted with all of the existing forces, all trends, and even all sensitivities. It enables a person to know to what degree the Tunisian people accept this or that orientation. But when violence gains the upper hand, there is no talk about trends or differences. The logic of force takes over, and force can result in the most dismal form of government."

We are forced to conclude the interview at this point because of lack of space and we promise our readers that we will publish the remainder of the interview in the next issue.

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CSO: 4504/185

TUNISIA

GHANOUNCHI'S ISOLATION CONTINUES

Tunis AL RA'Y in Arabic 19 Mar 82 p 5

[Text] Mr Rached Ghanouchi is still living in jail isolated from his comrades and the world and is unable to write or read except what publications the prison administration grants him, such as the magazine AL-FIKR. His guards refused to let him read a book displayed in the market THE SHI'AH IN IRAN, which is a Tunisian work that is remote from politics.

We learned that Mr Rached Ghanouchi did not go on a hunger strike last week but preferred to notify the administration of his determination to go on a hunger strike if it did not lift the restrictions imposed on him. He sent a letter to the administration to this effect and he may have gone on a hunger strike on Wednesday (the day before yesterday).'

We also learned that the restrictions were increased during the weekly visit which did not exceed ten minutes and took place in the presence of three guards - matter which made conversation between him and the members of his family difficult.

His brother sent a letter to the League for the Defense of Human Rights concerning the above-mentioned restrictions (the isolation and particularly the deprivation of writing tools).

The Government have the restrictions lifted, the head of the Islamic Movement is also demanding the issuance of a statute for the political prisoner. AL-RA'Y supports Mr Rached Ghanouchi in his demands and calls for restrictions to be lifted, for him to be considered a political prisoner, and for the issuance of the statute for political prisoners that we and numerous previous political prisoners called for.

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TUNISIA

BRIEFS

SOLIDARITY WITH SYRIAN PEOPLE--The Islamic Tendency Movement issued a statement in which it confirmed its solidarity with the Muslim people of Syria who live in "an atmosphere of terror, fear and destruction which reached its culmination, during the past few weeks in the artillery bombardment of Hamah, the terrorizing of the inhabitants, the death of innocent citizens and the destruction of houses, mosques and shops". The statement condemned "the brutal actions" of the ruling police regime and it appealed to international public opinion, independent international organizations and conscientious people to declare their disapproval of the continued massacres inflicted on the Syrian people and the glaring violation of their simplest rights. [Text] [Tunis AL RA'Y in Arabic 19 Mar 82 p 5]

ABDELFATTAH MORO'S HEALTH--We have learned that the health of the secretary general of the Islamic Tendency Movement Abdelfattah Moro has deteriorated during the past few days. We hope that he will find competent care in order to recover. [Text] [Tunis AL RA'Y in Arabic 19 Mar 82 p 5]

CSO: 4500/142

FEDERAL NATIONAL COUNCIL CLASHES WITH MINISTRIES OF JUSTICE, EDUCATION

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 13 Jan 82 p 6

[Article by Ahmad Muhsin : "Heated beginning of session of Federal National Council: Justice and educational policy on trial!"]

[Text] The discussions held in the meeting of the Federal National Council yesterday portended its heated parliamentary role.

Although the two main subjects under discussion are vital topics, the discussions on the judiciary and educational policy were characterized by a great deal of seriousness.

It is clear that the members who participated in the discussions had prepared themselves for confrontation with the government around these two subjects. The ministers of justice and education were no less ready than the members to respond, in such a way that the outcome of the discussions expressed the reality of the situations in the sectors of the judiciary and education.

Although the Council did not turn its attention to specific guidelines on these subjects, they created a climate of understanding and agreement between the legislative and executive powers so that the members of the Federal National Council were able to convey the citizens' problems and concerns related to these sectors, and at the same time the ministers were able to agree on the way to deal with some of the problems of administration and routine in both sectors.

Hilal Lutih, president of the Council, opened the session. After taking the roll call of the opening session, the secretary general read the agreements concluded by the government in 1981. These are:

- Federal document No 65 concerning the state of the Emirates' ratification of the constitution of the United Nations Organization for Industrial Development.

- Federal document No 67 with regard to the state's affiliation with the international establishment to settle investment disputes between contracting states and the subjects of other states.

- A federal document of agreement to amend some of the rules of the Arab Work Organization.

- A federal document of agreement to some of the changes which have been incorporated into the international postal documents of the federation.

- A federal document ratifying an agreement to organize the employment of Tunisian workers in the Emirates.

- A federal document ratifying an agreement to create the Arab Tourism Organization.

After a reading of the documents the Council turned to general subjects. The first was a discussion of government policy in judicial procedures. It was apparent from the torrent of questions and inquiries posed by members of the Council the extent of interest and enthusiasm attached by the members to this issue, as an issue linked with the security, justice and freedom of the citizens.

Faraj ben Hammudah began these discussions by focusing on the problem of delays in bringing cases to court and delays in processing these cases. This creates countless problems for citizens. Ben Hammudah said, "I have information that some cases are delayed between the primary court, the court of appeals, and the court of cassation for several years, although the nature of private claims in these cases does not require such a long time, such as cases of bounced checks."

Jabr Sayf: "I support Faraj ben Hammudah in his observation on the subject. I direct my question to the minister on the reasons for the existence of both Islamic law courts and civil courts in the state."

Sultan al-Habtur: "To follow up on what Faraj has said, I have noticed that some simple cases such as leasing cases in Sharjah are delayed several months. When we asked about the cause they told us that there is a great lack in the number of judges."

...: "Civil and criminal laws differ from one emirate to the next. How good it would be if the ministry worked to establish a unified legislation in all the emirates."

'Abd Allah al-Mazru'i: "The brethren have posed some questions that are outside the scope of the Ministry of Justice. There is the subject of the arrangement between the Ministries of Justice and the Interior. There have been excesses on the part of the Ministry of the Interior, especially in connection with the liberties of citizens who are imprisoned for a long time without trial. And likewise, excesses in connection with orders emanating from some authorities outside the Ministry of Justice."

Ahmad al-Midfa': "I would like to ask the minister for an explanation of the powers and relationship of the courts in each emirate in the matter of naval disputes."

The floor was given to the minister of justice to respond to these questions. After welcoming the good spirit and common interest of the members in the subject of justice, the minister said: "The truth is that I agree with the brother members that there is delay in issuing judgments, but there are reasons for this delay that I will try to briefly outline by the following:

- "There is a clear deficiency in the number of judges. The ministry has requested in its budgets for the last four years to fill this lack, but we find no response to this call.

- "The number of cases rose in 1981 to 740, from 653 in 1980, and 454 in 1979. This increase is due to the development and upswing which the country is experiencing. In spite of this increase, there has been no corresponding increase in the number of judges.

- "There is a legal vacuum in the country: unfortunately we have no civil and criminal laws, though there are some old laws written 13 years ago. The Committee on Islamic Legislation completed the preparation of these laws some time ago, but whenever we want to submit them we encounter new difficulties. This legal vacuum plays a role in delaying cases, because we are linked with judges from Egypt, Syria, North Africa and other countries. Each judge refers to the laws of his country due to the lack of legal texts among us.

- "Our cities and streets are not numbered, so officers and those who are reporting an incident have trouble relaying information. We have an insufficient number of clerks, court ushers, experts, and assistants for the judges in general.

"In spite of all that we find that in preparing decisions in cases each year judgments are issued fairly quickly compared with other countries, and there is an attempt to avoid delays as much as possible.

"With regard to the issue brought up by Faraj ben Hammuda concerning delays in some cases, there is no doubt that there are complex and multifaceted cases which require long deliberation because some laws permit procedures peculiar to the case and the presentation of proof and evidence; but these cases are few and can be counted on one hand.

"As for the issue of appeals and reversals of judgment, there is an inevitable struggle in any state, because the judge is human and subject to error; we can never find a perfect judge. In order to take precautions and achieve justice, courts of appeals were established to guarantee some justice, and the court of cassation as a guarantee of this justice.

"With regard to what was brought up by Jabr Sayf concerning the existence of civil courts and Islamic law courts, I am among those who support the establishment of Islamic law courts, and I hope that our judicial system will be in conformance with Islamic law, because that is the realization of swift justice derived from the glorious Koran.

"We have just completed the preparation of Islamic legislation, and we hope that the way will be prepared for its application.

"As for the subject of the amalgamation of local courts, the ministry has made efforts to unify them, and is still making efforts, because it is right for the courts to be one and their legislation unified.

"Concerning the arrangement between the ministries of Justice and the Interior, it exists. As for the detention in prison, I mentioned that the lack of judges actively contributes to the prolongation of detention, although the law stipulates a detention of 48 hours. We recommended in the proposed new law that the period of detention not exceed 24 hours.

"As for the independence of the judiciary, Islam gave it a great sanctity, as did the rightly-guided caliphs, because respect for the independence of the judiciary guarantees justice, whether on the part of the ruler or the ruled. Modern constitutions have been interested in the independence of the judiciary, and among them the constitution of the Emirates. We must say at this point that the process of interfering in the judiciary alarms us a great deal; it unfortunately exists. We have tried to explain that this interference with the judiciary is an injustice to the litigants. There is no doubt that the president of the state will pay attention to us on this issue. I hope that the authorities will understand and will accept the fact that interference in the judiciary causes great harm to everybody.

"Concerning naval disputes, there is a law governing the relationship between the courts in the Emirates."

It appears that the minister's frankness in clarifying the problem did not put an end to the discussion of the subject of the judiciary—rather, it became more heated.

Faraj ben Hammuda said, "I support the minister in his clarification of the truth, though it is a painful truth, that cases accumulate due to a lack of judges. A number of foreign business men and contractors have been able to escape outside the country as a result of the postponement of these cases.

Khalifa Matar: "I would like to ask about the fate of projects to create Islamic legislation."

Ahmad Sayi al Hisa: "The legal vacuum and the fact that judges refer to the laws of their countries are among the most important issues obstructing the realization of justice in the country. Likewise, we must examine government policy determining the number of government jobs and the interference which occurs from outside the ministry authorities before we start to place the blame on the ministry and its officials. As for the Islamic and positivistic legislation, the seventh article of the constitution stipulates that the Islamic religion is the essential source of legislation. We now want to know what is the alternative, and how do we deal with these conditions."

Hamad Abu Shihab: "What the minister has depicted is a sad situation, and also a dangerous one. How can the minister be content with such a situation, when he has borne the responsibility of this ministry for 5 years?"

Salih al-Shal: "Article 99 of the constitution granted the Supreme Federal Court many powers. Does this court take its full responsibilities, especially in cases of disputes and crimes which touch national security, or is its status only symbolic?"

'Abd Allah al-Mazru'i: "I do not hear any words expressing regret at the instances of bypassing the judiciary and its independence, and the lack of cooperation from other agencies. This failure of the ministry to achieve its goals grieves me very much."

Sultan al-Habtur: "Recommendations to the government are insufficient because they are left ignored in desk drawers. It is better that we find another way to dialogue with the government."

Then the floor was given once again to the minister of justice and he followed up on the questions of the members:

With regard to Islamic legislation he said, "This work is no easy matter. Jordan, for example, was able to prepare such legislation only after 12 years of working on it. The Supreme Committee for Islamic Legislation, after reviewing previous legislation in this area, was able to complete its work in only 3 years. We cannot submit it all at once to the government or to a private means of promulgation. But we have in fact begun, and we have sent the civil law to the Council of Ministers, where it was presented before the legislative committee, and it consented to it on condition that it be passed once again to the Council, and then to the National Council, so it may take its role in promulgation. As for the delay in promulgation itself, it stumbles due to causes known by all.

"In connection with the application of Islamic law, it encounters great opposition, even in our newspapers and in many of the official councils. The courts raised the issue of interest, and the world rose to arms. But we hope that by your helping us in this area we will bring about the realization of that to which we aspire.

"In regard to the issue raised by Salih al-Shal, the constitution grants the Federal Court a number of powers but unfortunately the constitution has not been implemented, although there are other cases presented before it."

Some of the members tried to prolong the discussion, but a suggestion from Hamad Abu Shihab that a committee be delegated to meet with the minister and the officials in the ministry to issue a detailed report on the subject in the next 15 days and then to meet with the president of the Council of Ministers, brought an end to the discussions, and the members agreed to the proposal.

A discussion of educational policy went calmly, as the minister calmly answered the questions of the members:

This calm discussion was begun by the second vice-president of the Council, 'Id al-Mazru'i, who focused on three topics:

First, the rate of educational productivity and the number of those who graduate from a given educational level without failing or lowering the standards.

Second, the extent to which female citizens who obtain secondary school degrees and then do nothing but housework are being beneficially employed.

The extent of the ministry's interest in the boy scout movement in the country.

Then he brought up an important topic, the Oxford project for English language programs which he described as representing a commercial transaction, interested in aspects of English civilization without any consideration of the nature of society in the Emirates. It is a project that is contrary to what is applied in the other Gulf countries.

Sultan Hamid brought up the subject of the supervision of private schools and the existence of books that oppose the Arab cause, i.e. the Palestinian cause.

And 'Abd Allah al-Mazru'i expressed concern over the small number of citizens compared with immigrants in the schools, and asked about the wisdom of offering education free of charge to non-citizens.

Hamad Abu Shihab called for the creation of an industrial base in the country by linking the educational process with the state plan for development.

The first vice-president, Sayf bi Hiss, pointed out the necessity of linking educational programs with the future form the country will take, since we are presently experiencing an upswing due to oil production. He called for a focus on technical education and evening school, and a review of expansion by setting up educational districts and limiting them to three districts only.

Then a number of members raised the question of corporal punishment in the schools.

In fact the minister of education's response was as broad as it was clear and convincing. The minister indicated the complicated problems of the executive, financial and supervisory bureaux in the state. Then he turned to the subject of educational policy. He said this policy aims to create the Arab Muslim individual.

With regard to the programs, he explained that the new programs for the elementary and intermediary levels will be ready next June.

In connection with educational productivity the minister affirmed that education is linked with the state's development plan, and that there is now a project for a technical education law which has been submitted to the Council of Ministers.

The ministry is trying to lower the rate of laxity in standards by denying civil service jobs to students before the secondary level.

With regard to corrective corporal punishment, the ministry will review the special decision on corporal punishment if national welfare so requires.

As for the wisdom of accepting immigrant students, the ministry has prepared a proposal for acceptance policy in preparation for its presentation to the government.

The minister then added that the ministry is working to encourage education between secondary school and the university; it now has thirteen educational qualifying centers, and will open intermediate faculties of education.

With regard to the English language programs, and the Oxford project in particular, he said, "we are convinced that it is a money-making project useful for John and Jack but not for Muhammad and 'Abd Allah. We will begin shortly to revise it to suit the local environment."

After the minister clarified all the issues raised, the members called for field visits to the ministry agencies to appraise themselves of the progress of work.

The the Council reviewed the report of the Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs concerning the Council budget proposal for financial year 1982, and they endorsed it. The president of the Council announced the end of the session, and that the next meeting will be on 26 January.

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CSO: 4404

MINISTRY OF PLANNING REPORT CITES LABOR STATISTICS

Dubai AL-BAYAN in Arabic 16 Jan 82 p 4

[Article: "Three out of every four citizens work in government and agriculture; 90 percent of oil and industry workers are immigrants"]

[Text] The Ministry of Planning revealed in a recently prepared study on human resources that the proportion of immigrants in the work force in the Emirates has reached 90 percent, and that the highest percentage of immigrants enter the sectors that represent the nerve center of our present and future economy, especially in the sector of oil, development industries, and finance, which include foreign investments, and sectors linked with them such as electricity, public utilities, and communications.

The study exposed some manifestations of instability in the work force in particular and in the size of the population in general, especially in the analysis of the sector of building and construction. This sector experienced an astonishing growth in the period between 1975 and 1977, until it came to include nearly a third of the total work force. In the following years the number of workers dropped, then rose until it obtained a fourth of the total work force. It is observed in this regard that the fluctuations in the job market in the construction sector were more in evidence because more than 90 percent of the daily work force in the state is employed in that sector.

The study explained that the obvious oscillation in the number of those occupied in this sector, which includes the majority of workers, especially immigrants, demonstrates the spontaneous results of planning in previous years and the necessity of drawing up a balanced long-term development program to avoid a large surplus of immigrant manual laborers who might not leave the region after the termination of their jobs.

The study said that citizens are concentrated in those sectors that have the lowest proportion of evolution and change, both in terms of work or new activities, and that out of every four citizens there are three who work in the government and agricultural sector. As for the sectors of finance, insurance, real estate, special services, and other development industries, only 4 percent of the total number of citizens turned to these sectors, which indicates a low citizen participation in the process of change and development. This is very clear within these activities in the past years.

The study added that the dimensions become more complex as one goes deeper into the analysis of the extent of immigrant occupation in the major activities and higher vocations; the proportion of immigrants in the state reached 99 percent of the workers in the construction sector, 98 percent of the workers in the petrochemical industries, 97 percent of the workers in the other development industries, no less than 95 percent of workers in trade, restaurants, hotels, transportation, storage, and communications, or than 92 percent of the workers in financial activities in the establishments of the private sector, in which there are 50 immigrant workers for every citizen. The proportion of immigrants to citizens reaches 15:1 in professional vocations and crafts, and 30:1 among workers in production.

The study demonstrated that the low educational level of citizens, at the same time as they form a low minority in the total work force, makes their influence in the development process weaker than the statistics show, since the illiteracy rate among working citizens is 60 percent, and there is a high percentage of those who have specialized professional and craft occupations whose educational level does not go beyond the primary level; and in view of their young age, most of their work experience in non-agricultural fields is no more than a few years.

The study indicated that the percentage of educated women in the work force is far greater than the proportion of participation among uneducated females: the participation of women who have completed secondary school is 49 percent, 63 percent for university graduates, and 88 percent for those who completed graduate studies; whereas only 2 percent of women who have not finished the primary level participate in the work force.

The study dealt with the problem of inflation in the work force; in the civil service bureau the work force expanded by 20 percent, and in the private sector by around 12 percent.

It also dealt with the subject of wage levels, and demonstrated in this regard that these levels are subject to great differences among the different nationalities, even within one profession. The study indicates that some engineers of certain nationalities receive a salary that is less than some clerks. The monthly wage in the Emirates varies from 850 dirhams to 16,000 dirhams in skilled vocations and crafts, and in clerical jobs from 650 to 3200 dirhams, an indication that the discrepancy in expertise might not be sufficient justification. On the level of sectors, the average monthly wage in the oil sector is more than ten times its counterpart in the agricultural sector.

The study called for setting priorities on the distribution of citizens over the sectors and sensitive jobs, in order to ensure national control of the economy. It suggested reliance on the following bases for establishing priorities:

- Orienting citizens toward the major leading sectors.

- Orienting citizens toward leadership positions.
- That priorities be established and citizens be distributed according to precise proportional rules, taking into account the low number of qualified citizens in the work force.
- Adopting procedures and policies which aim at raising the rate of population growth among the citizens.
- Encouraging women to enter fields of work.
- Raising the administrative capabilities of citizens.
- Organizing the work force and reducing its requirements by closing the gaps which provide means of illegal immigrant penetration.
- Re-evaluating the present condition of the work force.
- Improving the occupational mix in the work force.
- Re-evaluating the structure of establishments in the private sector.
- Linking educational and training policy with the established priorities.

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April 26, 1982